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Using a randomised experiment, we show that providing better information about
prospective jobs to vocational trainees can improve their placement outcomes. The
study setting is the vocational training programme DDU-GKY in India. We find that
including in the training two information sessions about placement opportunities make
trainees 17% more likely to stay in the jobs in which they are placed. We argue that this
effect is likely driven by improved selection into training. As a result of the intervention,
trainees that are over-optimistic about placement jobs are more likely to drop out before
placement.
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1 Introduction
Youth unemployment and underemployment are major issues for developing countries.
Although vocational training programs have been found to be generally effective in pro-
moting employment in some contexts (Alfonsi et al., 2020; Maitra and Mani, 2017), evi-
dence is mixed (Betcherman, 2004; Blattman and Ralston, 2017; McKenzie, 2017). In many
instances, high attrition from programmes limit their impact on employment outcomes. For
example, Heckman et al. (2000) report dropout as high as 79% in U.S. training programs.
Developing-country examples include Hirshleifer et al. (2016) for Turkey, Card et al. (2011)
for Dominican republic, and Cho et al. (2013) for Malawi. One potential reason for this
attrition is the mismatch between youth expectations and the jobs available to them. In
training programmes that also do placement, this mismatch is potentially easy to address
by better information about placement opportunities.
We examine this question in the context of the vocational training programme DDU-GKY
(Deen Dayal Upadhyay Grameen Kaushalya Yojana), one of the largest vocational training
programmes in the world, launched in 2014 by the Indian government for the rural youth.
Although the programme guarantees placement to every trainee, only about 60% of the 1.1
million DDU-GKY trainees have been placed so far.1 We build on three years of collabora-
tion with the agencies in charge of DDU-GKY in two of the poorest states of India (Bihar
and Jharkhand). We developed two short information sessions that provided details of the
placement opportunities (e.g. location, compensation) which were known to the training
provider but not the trainees. We report on a randomised experiment that evaluates the
effect of these sessions on training completion and job placement.
A simple conceptual framework suggests that providing information about prospective jobs
can improve placement outcomes of vocational trainees in two ways. First, some trainees
may be over-optimistic about placement prospects, and participate in the training even
though their outside options are better than the placement jobs provided by the scheme,
while others maybe over-pessimistic, and drop out too early. Better information will lead
the over-optimistic trainees to leave the training and the over-pessimistic to stay. This
selection channel implies that the intervention would increase the probability of staying
in the job conditional on placement but have an ambiguous effect on training completion
and placement. Second, knowing about the details of the placement jobs may make it
easier for trainees to transition into employment. This job readiness channel implies that the
intervention increases the value of the job, decreases dropout, and increases placement.
1Official statistics from http://ddugky.gov.in/ accessed on 3 Sept 2020.
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We find that trainees in the treatment group were on average 18% more likely to stay in
the jobs in which they were placed but we do not find a significant effect on dropout
or placement. These findings tend to support the selection rather than the job-readiness
channel. A direct way to test for the mechanisms is to estimate the effect of information
on trainees’ expectations about the placement jobs. We leverage post-intervention data
on trainees expectations, and find some evidence that trainees in the treatment group are
on average less optimistic about their likelihood of taking-up and staying in placement
jobs. However, these results are not fully conclusive because the data were collected a few
months after the first information session, and we were unable to measure expectations for
trainees who had updated their expectations negatively and dropped out.
To provide more evidence on the mechanisms, we test for heterogeneous effects of our
treatment along three dimensions: gender, education, and caste. In terms of gender, we
find the treatment effects to be entirely concentrated on men, for whom the treatment
increased the probability of staying for at least five months in the placement job by as
much as 55%. In contrast, there was no effect on women, who in the control group were
much more likely to complete the training and take up placement jobs than men. This is
consistent with a selection channel, because women in this context have far fewer labour
market opportunities than men outside of the programme, so that mismatched expectations
are likely to be a bigger issue for men. Turning to heterogeneity by education levels, we
find the intervention to have opposite effects on less educated trainees relative to more
educated ones. For the less educated trainees, who in the absence of the intervention had
a higher dropout relative to more educated ones, the intervention reduced dropout by
35%. For more educated trainees, however, the treatment increased dropout by 50%. These
results are again in line with the selection channel, since more educated trainees have better
outside options, and are less likely to value the placement jobs than the others. Finally, we
do not find any significant effect of our treatment across different caste groups.
Our paper contributes to the relatively thin literature on the effectiveness of vocational
training programs in developing countries. The two review papers by Blattman and Ral-
ston (2017) and McKenzie (2017) suggest that vocational training often have limited effect
on employment outcomes, although experiments in Uganda by Alfonsi et al. (2020) and in
India by Maitra and Mani (2017) show that vocational training has large positive long-term
effects on employment and earnings. Other evidence from India suggests that vocational
training provided by Industrial Training Institutes is usually of poor quality (Gasskov et al.,
2003; Bertrand and Crepon, 2015). On the DDU-GKY programme itself, Chakravorty and
Bedi (2019) find that 2-6 months after training completion, the employment rates are not sig-
nificantly different between DDU-GKY participants and non-participants. Prillaman et al.
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(2017) also document low rates of employment among DDU-GKY trainees nine months
after training. Our contribution is to show that a simple information intervention can make
vocational training programmes more effective.
Our paper is one of few papers that evaluate information interventions in vocational train-
ing programs. Hicks et al. (2011) inform prospective vocational trainees about returns to
vocational training, with little effect on enrolment, apart from more females enrolling into
male-dominated courses. Jensen (2012) finds that providing information about new work
opportunities in call centres to female youth in India increases their demand for vocational
training and employment. In a very similar context to ours, Banerjee and Chiplunkar (2018)
study the mismatch between DDU-GKY preferences of the trainees and the jobs they are
placed in. They find that an intervention which informs placement officers about trainee
preferences improves the match between trainees and jobs, and that trainees who were
matched with their preferred job stay longer in that job. Our contribution is to show that
informing vocational trainees about placement opportunities can improve their placement
outcomes in another way: by inducing self-selection of trainees who are a better fit for the
available jobs.
We also contribute to the literature on barriers to youth employment in developing coun-
tries. The literature emphasises search costs (Franklin, 2018; Abebe et al., 2017b), skills
signalling (Abebe et al., 2018; Bassi and Nansamba, 2019; Orkin et al., 2020; Abel et al.,
2020; Groh et al., 2015), or the mismatch between employers’ and workers’ characteristics
(Abebe et al., 2017a). Our contribution is to show that providing more accurate information
about the characteristics of the jobs available to young workers may help them to success-
fully complete their training and transition to employment.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes our experimental design and data,
Section 3 provides a theoretical framework to interpret the effects of the intervention, Sec-
tion 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
2 The training programme and the experimental design
2.1 The vocational training programme
The DDU-GKY programme targets unemployed rural youth aged 15-35 years from poor
families with some secondary education (10th or 12th grade). There are quotas for fe-
male and low caste (Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes) trainees. The programme is
mainly residential, and provides a mix of classroom and on-the-job training. Training and
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placements are the responsibilities of private training providers. The study is located n the
states of Bihar and Jharkhand, two of the poorest states of India, where job opportunities
are scarce, so that most DDU-GKY placement jobs are located in other states.
2.2 Intervention
The sample includes 86 batches from training centres located in Bihar and Jharkhand. A
batch is a group of students who enrol, have classes, and graduate together. There were
2,488 trainees in total or an average of 30 trainees per batch. The randomisation was carried
out at the training batch level, stratified by state and trade, forming 13 randomisation
strata. 42 batches were treated (Online Appendix B). All sampled batches were residential
programs consisting of 107 days of classroom training on average (between 58 and 205
days) and 17 days of on-the-job-training (between 0 and 60 days).
The intervention was delivered in two classroom sessions (A and B):
• Session A took place in the first two weeks after batch start, before “batch freezing’,
the time after which no new trainees can be enrolled. Treatment batches were pro-
vided with a list of detailed characteristics of potentially available placement jobs. Each
list was specific to a training-centre and trade, and included: job title, company name,
location (city and state), and compensation package (net monthly wage and in-kind
benefits). Placement officers were available to answer questions.
• Session B took place approximately 10 days before the completion of the classroom
training. Trainees from the treatment batches were provided with a detailed list of
positions that were actually available to them, with job title, company name, location,
and compensation package. Trainees were warned about the need to prepare to take
up a for possible migration. Once again, placement officers were available to answer
questions.
2.3 Data
Our research is based on primary data collected from four rounds of surveys of trainees: the
baseline and the midline surveys were conducted face-to-face, and the two endline surveys
on the phone. Trainees who were not surveyed at baseline (either because they were absent
on the day of the baseline survey, or due to some other reason), were not surveyed in the
followup rounds.
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• The baseline survey was administered from December 2018 to October 2019, to all
(2,488) participants present before batch freezing. We collected information on a wide
range of socioeconomic characteristics of the trainee and household, a range of psy-
chometric tests (GRIT, BIG 5, Attitude and self-esteem, life goals, risk preference),
expectations, preferences, opportunity cost, and programme awareness.
• The midline survey was conducted at the end of the classroom training but before
the trainees left for their placement jobs. This survey mainly captured the change in
expectations of the trainees. Interviews were carried out from March 2019 to January
2020 and covered 1,812 trainees who were present in the training centre on the day of
hte survey.
• The first endline survey was conducted approximately two months after the end of
the training, and the second endline five month after the end of the training. We
collected information on post-training outcomes focusing on training completion, job
placement, and job tenure. The first one one took place from May 2019 to April 2020
and cover 2,389 respondents. The second one from August 2019 to May 2020 and
covered 2,367 trainees.
Sample restrictions The Covid-19 pandemic and the lockdown that started on March 24
2020 caused severe disruption to the collection of our endline surveys. To accommodate the
disruption, we amended the original focus of the second-endline questionnaire regarding
respondents’ current status, to ask about status at the time of the 2020 Holi festival (which
started on March 9 2020) in order to better anchor the recollection of their activities. Online
Appendix Table C shows the number of individuals surveyed during the three sub-periods:
(i) pre-Holi (before March 9), (ii) between Holi and March 25 2020, and (iii) after March 25
2020. We restrict our analysis to the 2,163 individuals who had their first endline survey
before Holi.2
Attrition The attrition rate for each wave of the surveys, and the p-values associated
with the test of no difference across the treated and the control groups, are provided in
online Appendix Table D. Attrition is very low for the two endline surveys: 4% for the first
endline and 5% for the second endline. Attrition in the midline survey is higher (27%) as
the survey was only administered to trainees who were present at the time of the interview.
Importantly, attrition rates in all survey rounds are similar across the treatment and control
groups, including for the ‘restricted’ sample (Row 4 of Table D).
2We were not able to match 9 observations – see Row 1 Column 4 of online Appendix Table C.
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2.4 Summary statistics and balancing tests
The full set of variables and their definitions are provided in online Appendix Tables E1
and E2. Summary statistics of our baseline variables, and the results of the balance tests
for randomisation, are provided in online Appendix Table F. The average age in our sam-
ple is 20, and most trainees have some secondary education. There are more female than
male trainees, which is a remarkable achievement given the low labour force participation
of women in this context generally. In terms of caste, 15% of the trainees are Scheduled
Tribes, and 30% Scheduled Castes, which shows that DDU-GKY successfully targets dis-
advantaged youth.3 Another evidence of the pro-poor targeting of DDU-GKY is the very
high fraction (79%) of trainees from households below the poverty line. Median household
earnings are about 9,000 INR (122 USD) a month. Balancing tests suggest that there are no
issues with the randomisation (see Table F).
3 Model
We provide a simple theoretical framework to guide the interpretation of our results. It
illustrates two potential effects of information on employment and training outcomes: a




• At the time trainees enter the placement job, they compare their reservation utility
to the actual utility they derive from the job. R denotes the difference between the
reservation utility and the actual value of the job. If R > 0, youths leave the job. If
R < 0 they stay in the job.
• At the time trainees join the programme, they form an expectation about the utility
of the job they will be offered at the end of the training. Let V0 denote the difference
between the expected value of the job at the time of joining the programme and the
actual value of the job.
3The constitution of India classifies its citizens into four categories for affirmative action: Scheduled Castes
(SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) are various officially designated groups of historically disadvantaged people
in India. Other Backward Class (OBC) includes other groups/communities that are not SC or ST, and the rest
of the population is classified as general caste.
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• At the time trainees end the training and before they start in the job, they refine their
expectations. Let V1 denote the difference between the expected value of the job at
the time of completing the training and the actual value of the job.
• We assume that the learning process is such that V1 = lV0 + #, where # is a noise
parameter centred around zero that affects the value update during the training, and
l 2 [0, 1] is the learning parameter.
• Let lT denote the learning parameter for the treated group, and lC for the control
group. We assume lT  lC. The intervention gets expectations closer to the true
value of the job.
• Let Z is a binary treatment assignment indicator, which is randomised.
• Let D is a binary indicator for training completion and placement.
• Let S is a binary indicator for the individual staying in the DDU-GKY job for at least
5 months.
Timing:
• t=0: individual decides to go to the DDU-GKY centre iff V0 > R.
• t=1: individual decides to complete the training and take up the job (D = 1) iff
V1 > R.
• t=2: individual in placement job learns about its true value and decide to stay in the
job for at least five months (S = 1) iff R < 0.
3.2 Treatment effect on training completion and placement
Proposition 1. The treatment effect on training completion depends on youth expectations:
P(D = 1|Z = 1, V0 > 0)  P(D = 1|Z = 0, V0 > 0) < 0,
P(D = 1|Z = 1, V0 < 0)  P(D = 1|Z = 0, V0 < 0) > 0.
The information session brings trainees’ expectations closer to the true value of the job for
them. Hence the treatment discourages over-optimistic (V0 > 0) trainees, who become more
likely to drop out of the training and refuse placement, and encourages over-pessimistic
(V0 < 0) ones, who become more likely to complete training and accept placement. On-
line Appendix A Figure 1 provides an illustration of this proposition using a numerical
simulation.
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3.3 Treatment effect on staying in job conditional on placement
Proposition 2. The treatment increases the probability to stay in job conditional on placement:
P(S = 1|Z = 1, V1 > R)  P(S = 1|Z = 0, V1 > R) > 0.
Trainees who are placed in the treatment group have more accurate expectations about the
placement job, and hence are more likely to stay in the job than in the control.
3.4 Treatment effect on being in the job five months after training
Proposition 3. The treatment has an ambiguous effect on the (unconditional) probability of being
in the job five months after training:
• For trainees for whom the job has a lower value than the outside option (R > 0), the treatment
does not affect the probability to be in the job, five months after training.
• For trainees for whom the job has a higher value than the outside option (R < 0) and who are
overoptimistic (V0 > 0), the treatment decreases the probability to be in the job five months
after training, by decreasing their probability to be placed.
• For trainees for whom the job has a higher value than the outside option (R < 0) and who are
over-pessimistic (V0 < 0), the treatment increases the probability to be in the job five months
after training by increasing their probability to be placed.
3.5 Extension with job readiness
By increasing awareness about the jobs early-on in the training, the intervention may help
trainees prepare themselves to the transition to employment. We model this as an increase
in the true value of the job by t, leaving the outside option unchanged.
Proposition 4. For all trainees, an increase in t will increase training completion, placement and
the probability of being in the job conditional on being placed.
3.6 Discussion
The model simplifies the decision-making process in two important ways. First, the number
of periods and hence the possibilities to drop out is kept to a minimum in the model. In
reality, trainees can drop out any time during training and employment spells (e.g., after
batch freezing but before midline, after placement but before training completion, after
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placement but before three months). We refrain from exploiting this variation for simplicity
and to preserve statistical power.
Second, in our framework, training completion and job placement are a single decision. In
practice the two steps are distinct, and the training may have a value for trainees indepen-
dently from placement. We choose not to explore this aspect for two reasons: (i) training
completion and placement are both posterior to the intervention; and (ii) since the infor-
mation provided by the intervention focused on placement jobs, it is unlikely to have major
effects on training decisions unrelated to placement.
4 Results
4.1 Empirical framework
We restrict our estimation sample to trainees present at baseline . A batch b is in treatment
group if Zb = 1, in the control group if Zb = 0. An individual i in batch b(i), assigned to
a randomisation stratum s(i), has a vector of baseline characteristics Xi (control variables).
Our main estimation model for outcome yi is:
yi = bZb(i) + Xi
0a + ds(i) + #i.
b is the intention-to-treat effect, the parameter of interest in our setting. We use post-
double-selection lasso as in Belloni et al. (2013) to select the control variables in Xi. We
cluster standard errors by batches, and compute q-value following the False Discovery
Rate method by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) to handle multiple hypothesis testing.
4.2 Main outcomes
Table 1 presents the results for our main outcomes in columns numbered [1]-[4]. We first
consider the probability that the trainee is in the DDU-GKY job five months after training
completion (column [1]). This is the unconditional probability based on the full sample:
the dependent variable takes the value of 0 for trainees who did not complete the training,
and those who completed the training but were not placed. In the control group, 33% of
all trainees who started the training are in a placement job. This probability is 4.6 per-
centage points (ppt) (14%) higher in the treatment group. However, this is not statistically
significant.
The probability of dropping out of the programme is 14% in the control group, and not
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significantly different in the treatment group (column [2]). The probability of being placed
among those who completed the training is 50% and is not different in the two groups (col-
umn [3]). Column [4] presents the treatment effect on the conditional probability of being
in the job for at least 5 months conditional on placement. This probability is estimated to
be 12 ppt higher in the treatment group compared to 62% in the control group, a 18% in-
crease. The effect is positive and significant at the 5% level, but is not robust to adjustments
to multiple hypothesis testing à la Benjamini and Hochberg (1995).
In summary, these results suggest that treatment increases the probability of staying in the
DDU-GKY job for at least 5 months by about 14-18%. We do not find significant effects on
either the probability of dropout or the probability of placement conditional on dropout.
Within the framework of our theoretical model, these findings are consistent with selection
effects cancelling out on average. For example, the increase in dropout among trainees who
are poor fits for the job and the decrease in dropout among trainees who are good fits for
the job, cancelling out. They could also be consistent with a positive job readiness effect to
the extent that it is not anticipated, e.g., if it has no positive effect on dropout or placement
but only materialises once the trainees are actually on the job.
Table 2 reports the results for the additional outcomes collected from the endline surveys:
trainees’ employment situation, their location, their life satisfaction, and whether they use
skills from training in their current employment if they were employed. We do not find any
evidence in support that the intervention increased formal employment among trainees:
although the estimated treatment effect is about 10% of the control mean, it is not significant
(p-value of 0.31). This suggests that some of the positive treatment effect on the probability
of being in the placement job after five months was compensated by trainees in the control
finding other paid employment. We do not find any significant effect on the other outcomes
– see Columns [2]-[4].
4.3 Heterogeneity
Tables 3 and 4 report results for the main outcomes by sub-samples defined by gender
(women vs. men), caste (Schedules Caste/Scheduled Tribe vs. General Caste), education
(below 12th grade vs. 12th grade and above), and expected salary in the placement job at
baseline (distinguished by whether the expected salary is above or below the median of
the realised placement salary).4 Caste and gender correspond to two socio-demographic
dimensions of focus for the DDU-GKY programme. Education and expectations corre-
spond to the two dimensions of heterogeneity in our conceptual framework: more educated
4The median calculated within strata (state⇥trade).
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trainees may be less likely to join the placement job as they have higher outside options
and trainees who expect the placement jobs to pay more than it actually does may be more
likely to be disappointed when they are placed.
We first consider the treatment effects for women and men separately – Table 3 Panel A.
In the absence of any intervention, compared to males, women are much more likely to be
placed in a DDU-GKY job (60% vs. 37%), and to be still working in that job five months after
completing their training (74% vs. 39%). This is probably due to the fact that DDU-GKY
offers work opportunities which are rare for rural women, whose labour force participation
is low (Chatterjee et al., 2015). There is also a clear differential effect of treatment by
gender: there is no significant effect of women, and the effects are concentrated among
men. The effects for men are significant at conventional significance levels and are very
large in economic terms: the intervention increases the probability of placement of men by
a third, from 36% to 47%, and their probability of retention by 46%, from 39% to 57%, i.e.
it closes the gender gap in placement and staying in job by half. A possible explanation is
that the mismatch between trainees’ expectations and the placement job is more an issue
for men, because they have a broader range of outside options than women.
We next explore heterogeneity in treatment effects along the caste dimension. On average,
trainees from disadvantaged background (SC/ST) are more likely to be placed (57% vs.
44%) and also to stay in the placement job (67% vs. 58%) after 5 months compared to
those from OBC/General castes (Table 3 Panel B). The estimated treatment effect is not
very strong in this dimension but tends to exacerbate the differences across castes: the
probability of staying in the placement job conditional on being placed increases by 15 ppt
for SC/ST trainees (p-value of 0.01), as compared to 6 ppt for higher-caste ones (p-value of
0.21), the p-value of the difference between the two effects is 0.21.
In Panel A of Table 4, we study treatment heterogeneity by trainee’s highest educational
attainment. This classification is based on whether the individual had completed 12th grade
or higher, or not. As expected, in the control, conditional on training completion, less
educated trainees were more likely to be placed and stay in the job than more educated
ones, which is consistent with the fact that the jobs available were only semi-skilled. At
the same time, however, less educated trainees drop out twice as often as more educated
ones (18% vs. 10%), which may be due to learning difficulties in the training programme.
Interestingly, the intervention reduces dropout for the less educated by 35%, and increases
dropout for the more educated trainees by 50%. The difference between the two effects
is highly significant (p-value 0.002). This suggests that better information improves the fit
between trainees and jobs. The intervention did not affect placement rates for any of the
11
two groups conditional on training completion, but did increase the probability to stay in a
DDU-GKY job for both groups, although the effect is stronger and significant only for the
less educated trainees.
Finally, Panel B of Table 4 considers heterogeneity in terms of expected placement salary
at baseline. Interestingly, a majority of trainees (1795 out of 2163) had expectations higher
than the median wage that was offered at the end of the training: only about a quarter (368
trainees) had over-pessimistic expectations, which is consistent with the idea that over-
pessimistic trainees are less likely to join the programme. As expected, over-pessimistic
trainees are also less likely to accept the job offer (36%) than over-optimistic trainees in
the control group. There is some evidence of a decrease in dropout and an increase in
placement for the trainees with low expectations, which goes in the expected direction.
However, given the small sample sizes, neither effect is significant.
4.4 Mechanisms
Following our theoretical framework, our intervention can affect the outcomes via two dis-
tinct channels: increasing job readiness and improving selection into remaining in training.
The selection channel comes from the fact that the intervention delivers information about
jobs. Better-informed trainees make more time-consistent decisions about completing the
training and accepting the placement job; those who get placed are a better fit for the jobs
available. The job readiness channel comes from the fact that the intervention prepares
trainees better for the transition to employment, so that they are more likely to stay in the
job once placed.
The heterogeneity results point to an increase in training dropout among trainees who are
more educated, and a decrease in dropout among trainees who are less educated, which is
more consistent with the selection mechanism. More educated trainees have better outside
options than the jobs offered to DDU-GKY trainees, and would be less likely to stay in the
DDU-GKY job anyway. We also observe a strong positive effect on the probability to stay in
the DDU-GKY job conditional on being placed without any effect on dropout or placement
on average. These effects can only be consistent with improved job readiness if trainees do
not realise or anticipate that the intervention made them more prepared for employment.
We can also explore the effect of the intervention on trainees’ expectations about their
labour market prospects, using information collected in the midline survey, which was
carried out before the end of the training and the second part of the intervention. An
important caveat is that 27% of trainees were absent at the time of the midline survey, in-
cluding those who dropped out of the training. This implies that the information collected
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in this survey is unlikely to capture the mechanisms highlighted in the model. In particu-
lar, if the intervention lowered expectations of over-optimistic trainees and induced them
to drop out or if it increased expectations of over-pessimistic trainees and made them stay,
average expectations in the sample of trainees still enrolled may not change.
With this caveat in mind, Table 5 presents the estimated treatment effects on the expecta-
tions of the trainees. In Panel A of Table 5 we do not find any significant effect on: (i) the
perceived probability of getting a job; (ii) the average wage they expected from this offer;
(iii) the range in which they expected this offer to be; (iv) the location of the job. For com-
pleteness, we report in Appendix Tables H1 and H2 results for the different dimensions of
heterogeneity (gender, caste, education and expectations at baseline) but do not find any
significant effect by subgroup or any differential effect. There is a positive effect on salary
expectations for trainees who are less educated, and those who are over-pessimistic at base-
line, and a negative effect on salary expectations for trainees who are more educated, and
who are over-optimistic at baseline, but none of these effects is significant. Panel B of Ta-
ble 5 presents some evidence that trainees in the treatment group revised downwards their
willingness to accept a job inside of their state of residence, from 86% to 83% (p-value 11%)
and the likelihood that they would stay 12 months outside of state from 86 to 82% (p-value
8%). While these effects are small and borderline significant, given the actual placement
rates which are much lower (50% conditional on training completion), they suggest that on
average trainees became more realistic about their placement outcomes.
An alternative explanation for our findings, which we do not include in our model, is that
the intervention affected the match between the preferences of trainees and the jobs of-
fered to them. For example, better awareness of the job opportunities at the end of the
training may lead trainees to express their preferences to placement officers, and choose
their preferred options. Banerjee and Chiplunkar (2018) show that providing information
to placement officers about trainees’ preferences leads to more durable matches. To inves-
tigate this possibility, we decompose the placement process into three steps: job offer, offer
acceptance, and job placement, and estimate the treatment effect on each of them using the
sample of trainees who completed the training. Appendix Table G1 presents the results.
There is no evidence that the treatment increases the likelihood of a job offer (Column [1]),
or the likelihood that the offer is accepted conditional on having been made (Column [2]).
In contrast, there is a positive but insignificant effect on the likelihood that trainees stay in
the job for two months (p-value 0.145). Conditional on staying for two months, they stay for
at least five months (p-value 0.033). These results confirm that the treatment improved the
fit between trainees and placement jobs by changing the pool of trainees, not by changing
the likelihood or the quality of the offers made to them.
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5 Conclusion
We conducted a randomised experiment to evaluate an intervention that provided detailed
information about placement jobs to trainees of the Indian vocational training programme
DDU-GKY. We find that better informed trainees were 18% more likely to stay in the jobs
they were placed in. The increase in the probability of staying in the placed job for at least 5
months seems to be driven by self-selection, i.e., better information about prospective jobs
led some trainees who had better outside options to drop out earlier and motivated those
for whom the job opportunities were more valuable to complete the training.
Our results suggests that providing detailed information about post-training job opportuni-
ties can help trainees form more accurate expectations, improve self-selection into training,
and improve placement outcomes. Given the low cost and the simplicity of the information
sessions, the intervention can easily be scaled up to help the programme meet its objectives.
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Table 1: Results: Main Outcomes
In Placement Training Job In Placement
Job after 5m Dropout Placement Job after 5m
(unconditional) (conditional) (conditional)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Treatment 0.046 0.000 0.001 0.115
(0.041) (0.021) (0.047) (0.053)
p-value 0.262 0.984 0.977 0.033
q-value (MHT) 0.525 0.985 0.985 0.131
Observations 2070 2089 1799 890
Control Mean 0.330 0.136 0.493 0.624
Sample All All Trained Placed
Notes: See Appendix Table E1 for variable definitions. The dependent variables are all binary
indicators taking the value of 1 as follows. Column [1]: The trainee was still in a DDU-GKY job
after five months (unconditional); Column [2]: The trainee dropped out of training; Column [3]: The
trainee was placed in DDU-GKY job conditional on training completion; Column [4]: The trainee
was still in a DDU-GKY job after five months conditional on training completion and placement.
All regressions control for baseline characteristics chosen by lasso selection (Belloni et al., 2013) as
well as strata fixed effects. Standard errors account for clustering at the batch level. The reported
p-value is for the test of no treatment effect and the q-value is the p-value of the same test accounting
for multiple hypothesis testing (MHT) following the False Discovery Rate method by Benjamini and
Hochberg (1995).
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Table 2: Results: Short-Term and Long-Term Outcomes
Formal Outside Use Skills Life
Job State from Training Satisfaction
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel A: Two Months after Training
Treatment -0.015 -0.019 -0.048 -3.937
(standard error) (0.044) (0.055) (0.066) (2.365)
p-value 0.734 0.727 0.469 0.100
q-value (MHT) 0.734 0.734 0.734 0.401
Observations 2089 2088 961 2089
Control Mean 0.461 0.431 0.804 73
Panel B: Five Months after Training
Treatment 0.035 0.021 -0.007 6.504
(standard error) (0.036) (0.041) (0.060) (4.020)
p-value 0.339 0.605 0.908 0.113
q-value (MHT) 0.679 0.808 0.909 0.452
Observations 2070 2070 864 1222
Control Mean 0.400 0.344 0.687 71
Notes: See Appendix Table E1 for variable definitions. The dependent variables [1], [2] and [3] are
binary indicators taking the value of 1, and [4] is a continuous variable ranging from 0% to 100%.
Column [1]: The trainee was in a formal wage employment; Column [2]: The trainee lived outside
their home state; Column [3]: The trainee used the skills learned in training in their current occupation;
Column [4]: Life satisfaction of the trainees. All regressions control for baseline characteristics chosen
by lasso selection (Belloni et al., 2013) as well as strata fixed effects. Standard errors account for
clustering at the batch level. The reported p-value is for the test of no treatment effect and the q-value
is the p-value of the same test accounting for multiple hypothesis testing (MHT) following the False
Discovery Rate method by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995).
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Table 3: Heterogeneity of treatment effects by gender and caste
In Placement Training Job In Placement
Job after 5m Dropout Placement Job after 5m
(unconditional) (conditional) (conditional)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel A: Gender
Treatment * Female 0.003 -0.013 -0.081 0.039
(0.053) (0.026) (0.066) (0.050)
Treatment * Male 0.105 -0.002 0.115 0.179
(0.057) (0.030) (0.066) (0.107)
p-value Treatment Female 0.956 0.619 0.221 0.446
p-value Treatment Male 0.054 0.664 0.220 0.042
p-value Difference 0.171 0.508 0.081 0.129
Observations 2070 2089 1799 890
Control Mean Female 0.460 0.116 0.602 0.744
Control Mean Male 0.185 0.158 0.365 0.390
Panel B: Caste
Treatment * Lower Caste 0.076 -0.017 -0.024 0.150
(0.063) (0.030) (0.056) (0.071)
Treatment * Higher Caste 0.038 -0.004 -0.016 0.060
(0.043) (0.030) (0.049) (0.067)
p-value Treatment Lower Caste 0.214 0.867 0.653 0.013
p-value Treatment Higher Caste 0.319 0.896 0.987 0.215
p-value Difference 0.525 0.833 0.591 0.211
Observations 2070 2089 1799 890
Control Mean Lower Caste 0.380 0.137 0.567 0.669
Control Mean Higher Caste 0.291 0.136 0.437 0.579
Notes: The dependent variables are all binary indicators taking the value of 1 as follows. Column [1]:
The trainee was in DDU-GKY job five months after the end of training; Column [2]: The trainee dropped
out of training; Column [3]: The trainee was placed in DDU-GKY job conditional on training completion;
Column [4]: The trainee was still in a DDU-GKY job after five months conditional on training completion
and placement. ”Lower Caste” is a dummy variable equal to one for Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled
Caste, ”Higher Caste” a dummy variable for Other Backward Class and General Castes. All regressions
control for baseline characteristics chosen by lasso selection (Belloni et al., 2013) as well as strata fixed
effects. Standard errors account for clustering at the batch level.
20
Table 4: Heterogeneity of treatment effects by education and baseline expectations
In Placement Training Job In Placement
Job after 5m Dropout Placement Job after 5m
(unconditional) (conditional) (conditional)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel C: Education
Treatment * Less Educated 0.070 -0.058 -0.035 0.129
(0.052) (0.034) (0.050) (0.061)
Treatment * More Educated 0.048 0.050 -0.024 0.090
(0.043) (0.021) (0.050) (0.068)
p-value Treatment Less Educated 0.256 0.065 0.819 0.035
p-value Treatment More Educated 0.297 0.021 0.928 0.196
p-value Difference 0.724 0.002 0.747 0.590
Observations 2070 2089 1799 890
Control Mean Less Educated 0.379 0.183 0.573 0.664
Control Mean More Educated 0.293 0.101 0.437 0.587
Panel D: Salary Expectations
Treatment * Low Expectations 0.071 -0.043 0.016 0.197
(0.094) (0.033) (0.097) (0.167)
Treatment * High Expectations 0.051 0.002 -0.023 0.092
(0.042) (0.025) (0.044) (0.051)
p-value Treatment Low Expectations 0.452 0.207 0.842 0.242
p-value Treatment High Expectations 0.251 0.821 0.993 0.035
p-value Difference 0.792 0.215 0.834 0.557
Observations 2070 2089 1799 890
Control Mean Low Expectations 0.254 0.115 0.358 0.500
Control Mean High Expectations 0.344 0.140 0.519 0.641
Notes: The dependent variables are all binary indicators taking the value of 1 as follows. Column [1]: The
trainee was in DDU-GKY job five months after the end of training; Column [2]: The trainee dropped out of
training; Column [3]: The trainee was placed in DDU-GKY job conditional on training completion; Column [4]:
The trainee was still in a DDU-GKY job after five months conditional on training completion and placement.
”Less Educated” denotes trainees with less than 12th grade, ”More Educated” trainees with 12th grade and
above. ”Low Expectations” denotes trainees with baseline salary expectations below the median wage earned
by trainees of the same batch after placement. ”High Expectations” denotes trainees with expectations above
the median wage. All regressions control for baseline characteristics chosen by lasso selection (Belloni et al.,
2013) as well as strata fixed effects. Standard errors account for clustering at the batch level.
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Table 5: Results: Additional Outcomes
Treatment Standard p-value q-value Control
Error (MHT) Mean
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Panel A: Intermediary Outcomes
Likelihood of Job Offer 0.006 0.087 0.948 0.949 9.41
Average Salary -160.078 255.622 0.533 0.949 11334.025
Max - Min Salary -45.341 226.544 0.842 0.949 3693.044
Likelihood Job Offer Out of State -0.016 0.138 0.907 0.949 8.857
Panel B: Secondary Outcomes
Expected Earnings in 12 Months 293.758 485.074 0.547 0.703 14615.507
Preferred Earnings in 12 Months 824.164 565.874 0.150 0.394 18184.493
Likelihood Training Completion 0.049 0.036 0.175 0.394 9.800
Training Useful 0.006 0.079 0.943 0.971 9.452
Training Satisfaction 0.072 0.074 0.337 0.506 9.507
Likelihood Accept Job In State -0.310 (0.184) 0.096 0.394 8.548
Likelihood Stay 12 Months In State -0.346 (0.197) 0.083 0.394 8.501
Likelihood Accept Job Out of State -0.005 (0.147) 0.971 0.971 8.73
Likelihood Stay 12 Months Out of State -0.156 (0.157) 0.325 0.506 8.618
Notes: The dependent variables are captured at midline survey. See Appendix Table E1 for variable definitions.
Total number of observations used is 1613. Likelihood variables range from 0% to 100%. Panel A comprises of
Likelihood of getting a job at the end of the training; Expected average salary on the job offered at the end of the
training (in rupees); The difference between the maximum and the minimum expected salary on the job offered at
the end of the training (in rupees); Likelihood of getting a job outside of state at the end of the training. Panel B
shows the treatment effects on Expected earnings after 12 months; Desired earnings after 12 months; Likelihood
of completing the training; Degree to which the training is useful; Degree to which the trainees are satisfied with
the training; Likelihood of accepting a job in the state; Likelihood of staying 12 months in a job in the state after
accepting it; Likelihood of accepting a job outside the state; Likelihood of staying 12 months in a job outside the state
after accepting it. All regressions control for baseline characteristics chosen by lasso selection (Belloni et al., 2013) as
well as strata fixed effects. Standard errors account for clustering at the batch level. The reported p-value is for the
test of no treatment effect and the q-value is the p-value of the same test accounting for multiple hypothesis testing






We illustrate our theoretical predictions using a numerical simulation here. In Panel A, we
place individuals as a function of their V0 and R. Individuals who decide to enrol are all
those below the V0 = R line, for whom the expected value of the job is higher than their
outside option.
During the training, individuals receive information about the value of the job. The value
of V1 is shown on the x-axis of Panels B and C, while R remains unchanged on the y-axis.
Panel B shows the joint distribution of (V1, R) in the control group, for whom lC = .8. We
see that a few individuals are pushed out of the V1 > R part, and will choose to drop out.
For the treatment group, for whom lT = .2, the distribution of V1 is much more concen-
trated around the true value of the job (Panel C). Panel D highlights four types of candidates
by comparing the control and treatment distributions. The first group is composed of over-
optimistic trainees (square shape), for whom the treatment reduces V1, which increases
their dropout probability. The second group is composed of over-pessimistic trainees (tri-
angle shape), the treatment increase V1, bringing it closer to the truth, which increases their
training completion probability. The third group is composed of trainees who have low
value of the training and would drop-out with or without the intervention (cross shape).
The fourth group are trainees for whom the training is better than the outside option and
who would complete the training with or without the intervention (circle shape).
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Figure 1: Theoretical framework: numerical illustration
(a) Enrollment (b) Training completion (control group)
(c) Training completion (Treatment group) (d) Training completion (Treatment effect)
A.2 Proof of proposition 1
Given (D = 1) iff V1 > R
P(D = 1|Z = 1)  P(D = 1|Z = 0) =P(V1 > R|Z = 1)  P(V1 > R|Z = 0)
=P(lTV0 + # > R)  P(lCV0 + # > R)
Since lT < lC the sign of this expression depends on the sign of V0:
P(V1 > R|Z = 1, V0 > 0)  P(V1 > R|Z = 0, V0 > 0) < 0,
P(V1 > R|Z = 1, V0 < 0)  P(V1 > R|Z = 0, V0 < 0) > 0.
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A.3 Proof of proposition 2
P(S = 1|Z = 1, V1 > R)  P(S = 1|Z = 0, V1 > R)
= P(S = 1|lTV0 + # > R)  P(S = 1|lCV0 + # > R).
Since lT < lC, the expression is negative.
A.4 Proof of proposition 3
Proof: We first consider people with a negative value of being in the job (R > 0). For them,
the probability of staying in the job is equal to zero regardless of the treatment, so that the
impact of the treatment is mechanically zero:
P(S = 1|Z = 1, R > 0) = P(S = 1|Z = 0, R > 0) = 0
We next consider people with a positive value of being in the job (R < 0). They will be
placed if and only if they complete the training:
P(S = 1|Z = 1, R < 0)  P(S = 1|Z = 0, R < 0)
= P(D = 1|Z = 1, R < 0)  P(D = 1|Z = 0, R < 0)
= P(lTV0 + # > R|R < 0)  P(lCV0 + # > R|R < 0).
The sign of the above expression depends on the sign of V0:
• For trainees who are over-optimistic (V0 > 0) and have positive value of being in the
job (R < 0), the treatment effect on the probability of being in the job is negative:
P(lTV0 + # > R|V0 > 0, R < 0)  P(lCV0 + # > R|V0 > 0, R < 0) < 0.
• For trainees who are over-pessimistic (V0 < 0) and have a positive value of being in
the job (R < 0), the treatment effect on the probability of being in the job is positive:
P(lTV0 + # > R|V0 < 0, R < 0)  P(lCV0 + # > R|V0 < 0, R < 0) > 0.
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A.5 Proof of proposition 4
Treated trainees will choose to complete training and get placed iff lTV0 + t + # > R, while
the criterion remains lCV0 + # > R for trainees in the control group. Treated trainees who
get placed will choose to stay on the job iff R < t, while their control counterparts will stay
iff R < 0.
B Batches surveyed by sector
Table B: Number of batches surveyed by sector and state
Sector Control Treatment Total
BIHAR STATE
Apparel 3 3 6
Banking, Financial Services, and Insurance 3 3 6
Construction 7 7 14
Healthcare 1 1 2
IT 6 5 11
Logistics 1 1 2
Retail 4 4 8
Tourism-hospitality 3 2 5
TOTAL 28 26 54
JHARKHAND
Apparel 9 8 17
Automotive 1 1 2
Construction 4 5 9
Healthcare 1 1 2
Security 1 1 2
TOTAL 16 16 32
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C Timing of the surveys
Table C: Endline completion dates and sample sizes
Second Endline
Time of survey Pre Holi Holi - 25 Mar Post 25 Mar Total
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Pre Holi 1092 187 893 2172
First Endline Holi - 25 Mar 0 0 62 62
Post 25 Mar 0 0 254 254
Total 1092 187 1209 2488
Note: This table shows the time periods for the first and second endlines. Column [1] presents the
survey periods, and Columns [2]-[5] present the numbers surveyed during the respective periods.
The start of the Holi festival was the 9th March, 2020.
D Attrition
Table D: Attrition Rates
Survey Control Treatment p-value
Timing Mean Effect
[1] [2] [3]
Attrition Midline 0.268 0.004 0.900
Attrition First Endline 0.041 -0.003 0.662
Attrition Second Endline 0.049 -0.001 0.886
COVID-related Sample Restriction 0.094 -0.010 0.777
Notes: Column [2] is obtained from the regression of attrition dummy on an intercept and the
treatment indicator, controlling for strata fixed effects. The p-values associated with the test of
no effect of treatment, are in Column [3]. The number of observations is 2,488.
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E Variable definition
Table E1: Outcome variables
Variable Name Variable Definition
Panel A: Main Outcomes
In placement job after 5 months (unconditional) In DDU-GKY job after 5 months of training completion
Training dropout The trainee dropped out of training during training tenure
Job placement (conditional) Placed in a DDU-GKY job conditional on training completion
In placement job after 5 months (conditional) Being in DDU-GKY job after 5 months of training com-
pletion conditional on placement
Panel B: Intermediary Outcomes
Likelihood job offer (0-10) Likelihood of getting a job offer after training
Average salary (Rs) Expected average salary on the job after training
Difference maximum - minimum salary (Rs) Difference of maximum and minimum expected
salaries in job after training
Likelihood job offer out of state (0-10) Likelihood of the job being outside the residence state
Panel C: Secondary Outcomes
Expected Earnings in 12 months Expected earnings after 12 months of training
Preferred Earnings in 12 months Preferred earnings after 12 months of training
Likelihood training completion (0-10) Likelihood of completing the training course
Training usefulness (0-10) Perception of training usefulness
Training satisfaction (0-10) Satisfaction with training
Likelihood accept job in state (0-10) Likelihood of accepting a job if the job is within the
residence state
Likelihood stay 12 months in state (0-10) Likelihood of staying in a job if the job is within the
residence state for 12 months
Likelihood accept job out of state (0-10) Likelihood of accepting a job if the job is outside of the
residence state
Likelihood stay 12 months out of state (0-10) Likelihood of staying in a job if the job is outside of the
residence state for 12 months
Panel D: Additional Outcomes
Formal job The trainee was in a wage/salaried job
Outside state The trainee lived outside the residence state
Use skills from training Used the skills learned in training in their current occupation;
Life satisfaction (0-10) Life satisfaction of the trainees
Notes: The likelihood variables are scored from 0% (least likley) to 100% (most likely).
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Table E2: Control variables
Variable Name Variable Definition
Panel A: Individual Characteristics
Female Trainee is female
Older (More than 20) Age of trainee more than 20 years
Married Trainee is married
Caste: ST Caste is Scheduled Tribe
Caste: OBC Caste is Other Backward Class
Caste: General Caste is General
Religion: Muslim Religion is Muslim
Religion: Christian Religion is Christian
Panel B: Education
Middle school (6-8 class) Educated till 6-8 class
Lower secondary (9-10 class) Educated till 9-10 class
Tertiary education (Graduate & above) Educated till graduation and above
Matriculation exam (Class X) Passed class 10th
Exam score more than 50% Matric exam score more than 50%
Higher secondary exam (Class XII) Passed class 12th
Exam score less than 50% 12th exam score less than 50%
Panel C: Skills
Big 5 Extraversion Test (1 to 5) Set of forty-four questions, scored between “strongly
disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5)
Big 5 Agreeableness Test (1 to 5)
Big 5 Conscientiousness Test (1 to 5)
Big 5 Neuroticism Test (1 to 5)
Big 5 Openness Test (1 to 5)
Grit Test (1 to 5) Set of seven questions, scored between “Very much
like me” (1) to “Not much like me at all” (5)
ASE Test (1 to 4) Set of ten questions, scored between “Strongly agree”
(1) to “Strongly Disagree” (4)
Life goal Test(1 to 4) Set of five questions, scored between “Very Important”
(1) to “Not at all important” (4)
Duration of baseline survey (above median) Duration of baseline survey more than median
Notes: These are based on information captured during the baseline survey.
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Table E2: Control variables (continued)
Variable Name Variable Definition
Panel D: Family Background
Household head relationship (mother) Head of household is mother
Household head relationship (others) Head of household is other than mother and father
Immediate difficulty to family immediate Difficulty to family if the trainee is in training centre during training
Future difficulty to family Difficulty to family if the trainee is in job outside the state for 12 months
Earning members (3 or more) Number of earning members in the household
Household earning (15000 or more) Household earning
Household earning (5000 or less )
Household earning (5001-9000 )
Agriculture land Household has agriculture land
BPL card Household is below poverty line
RSBY card Household covered under government health insurance scheme
MNREGA Any member of household worked in MNREGA in the past one year
SHG member Any member of household is a member of self-help group
Semi pucca house Type of house
Pucca house(IAY)
Pucca house(Non IAY)
Own house If the houshold own a house
Internet use If the trainee had used internet before joining training
Joint household Type of household
Household members (2 or less) Number of household members
Household members (6 or more)
Ever migrated out of state (self) Trainee migrated out of state in the last one year
Ever migrated out of state (relatives) Any household member migrated out of state in the last one year
Relatives migrated (one) Number of household members migrated out of state in the last one year
Relatives migrated (2 or more)
Note: Difficulty variables are expressed as a fraction between zero and one.
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Table E2: Control variables (end)
Variable Name Variable Definition
Panel E: Expectations
Previous earning Previous earning of trainee
Hypothetical earning (immediate) Hypothetical earning now, had he/she not participated in training
Hypothetical earning (in one year) Hypothetical earning one year from now, had he/she
not participated in training
Expected earning (in one year) Expected earning one year from now, after training completion
preferred earning (in one year) Preferred earning one year from now, after training completion
Expected minimum salary (immediate) Expected minimum salary in job after training
Expected maximum salary (immediate) Expected maximum salary in job after training
Expected average salary (immediate) Expected average salary in job after training
Training awareness Awareness of the training scheme
Training usefulness Perceived usefulness of the training programme
Training satisfaction Perceived satisfaction with the decision to participate
Likelihood of training completion Likelihood of completing the training programme
Likelihood of job offer Likelihood of getting a job offer after training completion
Likelihood of job offer outside state Likelihood that the job offer will be outside the residence state
Likelihood of accepting job inside state Likelihood of accepting a job if the job is in the residence state
Likelihood of retention in job inside state Likelihood of staying in this job for 12 months
Likelihood of accepting job outside state Likelihood of accepting a job if the job is outside the residence state
Likelihood of retention in job outside state Likelihood of staying in this job for 12 months
Note: The earning variables are dummy variables equal to one if the individual response is above the median in
the stratum (state⇥trade). The likelihood variables are expressed as a fraction between zero and one.
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F Summary statistics and balance test
Table F: Baseline summary statistics (averages) and balance tests - [Part 1 of 3]
Variable Control Treatment Diff p-value
Group Group [2]-[1]
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel A: Demographics and Caste
Female 0.564 0.585 0.021 0.758
Older (More than 20) 0.280 0.241 -0.039 0.131
Married 0.093 0.112 0.019 0.258
Caste:ST 0.153 0.146 -0.007 0.811
Caste:OBC 0.484 0.524 0.040 0.331
Caste:General 0.066 0.078 0.012 0.436
Religion:Muslim 0.059 0.054 -0.005 0.801
Religion:Christian 0.034 0.035 0.001 0.962
Panel B: Education
Middle school (6-8 class) 0.071 0.054 -0.017 0.142
Lower secondary (9-10 class) 0.362 0.364 0.002 0.950
Tertiary education (Graduate & above) 0.091 0.084 -0.007 0.670
Matriculation exam (Class X) 0.906 0.924 0.018 0.180
Exam score more than 50% 0.466 0.487 0.021 0.416
Higher secondary exam (Class XII) 0.553 0.565 0.012 0.756
Exam score less than 50% 0.228 0.216 -0.012 0.543
Panel C: Skills
Big 5 Extraversion Test (1 to 5) 3.294 3.289 -0.005 0.869
Big 5 Agreeableness Test (1 to 5) 3.747 3.775 0.028 0.338
Big 5 Conscientiousness Test (1 to 5) 3.815 3.916 0.101 0.009
Big 5 Neuroticism Test (1 to 5) 2.460 2.420 -0.040 0.333
Big 5 Openness Test (1 to 5) 3.904 4.007 0.103 0.030
Grit Test (1 to 5) 3.374 3.450 0.076 0.039
ASE Test (1 to 4) 2.104 2.084 -0.020 0.352
Life goal Test(1 to 4) 2.147 2.136 -0.011 0.588
Duration of baseline survey (above median) 0.501 0.541 0.040 0.362
Number of observations 1041 935
Notes: Variable definitions are provided in online Appendix Tables E1 and E2. Columns [1] and [2] report the
mean value in the control group and treatment group respectively. Treatment dummy coefficient estimates in the
regression of the variable, controlling for the strata fixed effects are in column [3]. All standard errors account
for clustering at the batch level. The p-value associated with the test of no treatment effect is in column [4]. Total
number of observations used is 1,976.
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Table F: Baseline summary statistics (averages) and balance test (cont’d) [Part 2 of 3]
Variable Control Treatment Diff p-value
Group Group [2]-[1]
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel D: Socioeconomic background
Household head relationship (mother) 0.077 0.084 0.007 0.560
Household head relationship (others) 0.084 0.124 0.040 0.009
Immediate difficulty to family 0.092 0.108 0.016 0.296
Future difficulty to family 0.138 0.150 0.012 0.543
Earning members (3 or more) 0.087 0.113 0.026 0.088
Household earning (15000 or more) 0.135 0.186 0.051 0.016
Household earning (5000 or less ) 0.314 0.245 -0.069 0.020
Household earning (5001-9000 ) 0.225 0.228 0.003 0.895
Agriculture land 0.603 0.667 0.064 0.050
BPL card 0.794 0.759 -0.035 0.188
RSBY card 0.371 0.345 -0.026 0.336
MNREGA 0.252 0.209 -0.043 0.062
SHG member 0.764 0.770 0.006 0.813
Semi pucca house 0.202 0.226 0.024 0.310
Pucca house(IAY) 0.099 0.076 -0.023 0.118
Pucca house(Non IAY) 0.191 0.220 0.029 0.272
Own house 0.995 0.994 -0.001 0.662
Internet use 0.478 0.488 0.010 0.793
Joint household 0.062 0.076 0.014 0.239
Household members (2 or less) 0.061 0.045 -0.016 0.117
Household members (6 or more) 0.384 0.379 -0.005 0.853
Ever migrated out of state (self) 0.121 0.121 0.000 0.986
Ever migrated out of state (relatives) 0.498 0.529 0.031 0.296
Relatives migrated (one) 0.364 0.357 -0.007 0.754
Relatives migrated (2 or more) 0.134 0.172 0.038 0.146
Number of observations 1,041 935
Notes: Difficulty variables are expressed as a fraction between zero and one. Also see notes provided with
the first part of this Table [Part 1 of 3].
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Table F: Baseline summary statistics (averages) and balance test (cont’d) [Part 3 of 3]
Variable Control Treatment Diff p-value
Group Group [2]-[1]
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel E: Expectations
Previous earning 0.099 0.105 0.006 0.712
Hypothetical earning (immediate) 0.113 0.144 0.031 0.148
Hypothetical earning (in one year) 0.184 0.203 0.019 0.557
Expected earning (in one year) 0.379 0.411 0.032 0.484
Preferred earning (in one year) 0.418 0.454 0.036 0.429
Training awareness 0.546 0.528 -0.018 0.369
Training usefulness 0.936 0.931 -0.005 0.510
Training satisfaction 0.947 0.947 0.000 0.934
Likelihood of training completion 0.952 0.944 -0.008 0.229
Likelihood of job offer 0.904 0.898 -0.006 0.523
Expected minimum salary (immediate) 0.372 0.406 0.034 0.546
Expected maximum salary (immediate) 0.384 0.422 0.038 0.444
Expected average salary (immediate) 0.449 0.487 0.038 0.473
Likelihood of job offer outside state 0.787 0.794 0.007 0.672
Likelihood of accepting job inside state 0.848 0.844 -0.004 0.758
Likelihood of retention in job inside state 0.838 0.832 -0.006 0.688
Likelihood of accepting job outside state 0.827 0.828 0.001 0.935
Likelihood of retention in job outside state 0.820 0.818 -0.002 0.884
Number of observations 1041 935
Notes: Earning variables are dummy variables equal to one if the survey response is above the median in the
stratum (state⇥trade). Likelihood variables are expressed as a fraction between zero and one. Also see notes
provided with the first part of this Table [Part 1 of 3].
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G Other outcomes
Table G1: Results: Job offer, acceptance, placement, and staying in job
Job Job Job In placement
Offer Acceptance Placement job after 5m
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Treatment -0.026 -0.033 0.067 0.116
(standard error) (0.046) (0.038) (0.046) (0.053)
p-value 0.576 0.390 0.145 0.033
q-value (MHT) 0.577 0.521 0.29 0.134
Observations 1688 1391 1091 883
Control Mean 0.833 0.795 0.790 0.623
Note: The dependent variables are all binary indicators taking the value of 1 as follows.
Column[1]: The trainee received job offer conditional on training completion; Column[2]:
The trainee accepted the job conditional on job offer being made; Column[3]: The trainee
was placed in a DDU-GKY job conditional on job acceptance; Column[4]: The trainee was
still in DDU-GKY job conditional on placement. All regressions control for baseline charac-
teristics chosen by lasso selection (Belloni et al., 2013) as well as strata fixed effects. Standard
errors account for clustering at the batch level. The reported p-value is for the test of no
treatment effect and the q-value is the p-value of the same test accounting for multiple
hypothesis testing (MHT) following the False Discovery Rate method by Benjamini and
Hochberg (1995).
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H Heterogenous effects of treatment
Table H1: Treatment effects on intermediary outcomes by gender and caste
Likelihood Average Max - Min Likelihood Job
Job Offer Salary Salary Offer Out of State
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel A: Gender
Treatment * Female 0.030 3.233 -194.060 -0.026
(0.128) (354.298) (318.412) (0.205)
Treatment * Male -0.048 -351.462 44.164 -0.064
(0.117) (324.245) (254.312) (0.183)
p-value Treatment Female 0.817 0.993 0.544 0.900
p-value Treatment Male 0.682 0.282 0.863 0.726
p-value Difference 0.653 0.450 0.559 0.884
Observations 1613 1613 1613 1613
Control Mean Female 9.334 10753.946 3857.620 8.791
Control Mean Male 9.503 12032.161 3494.975 8.937
Panel B: Caste
Treatment * Lower Caste -0.021 -153.442 139.856 -0.054
(0.124) (301.967) (332.991) (0.143)
Treatment * Higher Caste 0.024 -252.246 -279.364 -0.015
(0.104) (282.819) (225.103) (0.185)
p-value Treatment Lower Caste 0.869 0.613 0.676 0.708
p-value Treatment Higher Caste 0.821 0.375 0.219 0.936
p-value Difference 0.758 0.721 0.235 0.834
Observations 1613 1613 1613 1613
Control Mean Lower Caste 9.447 11297.943 3743.702 8.987
Control Mean Higher Caste 9.381 11362.787 3652.664 8.754
Notes: The dependent variables are captured at midline survey. See Appendix Table E1 for variable
definitions. Likelihood variables range from 0% to 100%. Column [1]: Likelihood of getting a job at the
end of the training; Column [2]: Expected average salary on the job offered at the end of the training
(in rupees); Column [3]: The difference between the maximum and the minimum expected salary on
the job offered at the end of the training (in rupees); Column [4]: Likelihood of getting a job outside of
state at the end of the training. ”Lower Caste” is a dummy variable equal to one for Scheduled Tribes
and Scheduled Caste, ”Higher Caste” a dummy variable for Other Backward Class and General Castes.
All regressions control for baseline characteristics chosen by lasso selection (Belloni et al., 2013) as well
as strata fixed effects. Standard errors account for clustering at the batch level.
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Table H2: Treatment effects on intermediary outcomes by education and baseline expecta-
tions
Likelihood Average Max - Min Likelihood Job
Job Offer Salary Salary Offer Out of State
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel A: Education
Treatment * Less Educated -0.047 118.836 46.561 -0.026
(0.117) (328.344) (324.621) (0.151)
Treatment * More Educated 0.049 -387.693 -91.802 -0.033
(0.105) (280.346) (218.080) (0.186)
p-value Treatment Less Educated 0.690 0.718 0.886 0.863
p-value Treatment More Educated 0.643 0.171 0.675 0.861
p-value Difference 0.484 0.121 0.635 0.974
Observations 1613 1613 1613 1613
Control Mean Less Educated 9.418 10890.164 3702.732 9.022
Control Mean More Educated 9.405 11651.937 3686.106 8.740
Panel B: Salary Expectations
Treatment * Low Expectations 0.030 49.327 -129.257 0.141
(0.112) (358.829) (370.468) (0.332)
Treatment * High Expectations -0.000 -185.937 -49.500 -0.046
(0.102) (281.993) (242.678) (0.142)
p-value Treatment Low Expectations 0.792 0.891 0.728 0.672
p-value Treatment High Expectations 0.997 0.512 0.839 0.748
p-value Difference 0.844 0.561 0.847 0.565
Observations 1613 1613 1613 1613
Control Mean Low Expectations 9.507 10699.247 3486.301 8.692
Control Mean High Expectations 9.391 11460.807 3734.337 8.891
Notes: The dependent variables are captured at midline survey. See Appendix Table E1 for variable defi-
nitions. Likelihood variables range from 0% to 100%. Column [1]: Likelihood of getting a job at the end of
the training; Column [2]: Expected average salary on the job offered at the end of the training (in rupees);
Column [3]: The difference between the maximum and the minimum expected salary on the job offered at
the end of the training (in rupees); Column [4]: Likelihood of getting a job outside of state at the end of the
training. ”Less Educated” denotes trainees with less than 12th grade, ”More Educated” trainees with 12th
grade and above. ”Low Expectations” denotes trainees with baseline salary expectations below the median
wage earned by trainees of the same batch after placement. ”High Expectations” denotes trainees with expec-
tations above the median wage. All regressions control for baseline characteristics chosen by lasso selection
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1 Introduction
Youth unemployment and underemployment are major issues for developing countries.
Although vocational training programs have been found to be generally effective in pro-
moting employment in some contexts (Alfonsi et al., 2020; Maitra and Mani, 2017), evi-
dence is mixed (Betcherman, 2004; Blattman and Ralston, 2017; McKenzie, 2017). In many
instances, high attrition from programmes limit their impact on employment outcomes. For
example, Heckman et al. (2000) report dropout as high as 79% in U.S. training programs.
Developing-country examples include Hirshleifer et al. (2016) for Turkey, Card et al. (2011)
for Dominican republic, and Cho et al. (2013) for Malawi. One potential reason for this
attrition is the mismatch between youth expectations and the jobs available to them. In
training programmes that also do placement, this mismatch is potentially easy to address
by better information about placement opportunities.
We examine this question in the context of the vocational training programme DDU-GKY
(Deen Dayal Upadhyay Grameen Kaushalya Yojana), one of the largest vocational training
programmes in the world, launched in 2014 by the Indian government for the rural youth.
Although the programme guarantees placement to every trainee, only about 60% of the 1.1
million DDU-GKY trainees have been placed so far.1 We build on three years of collabora-
tion with the agencies in charge of DDU-GKY in two of the poorest states of India (Bihar
and Jharkhand). We developed two short information sessions that provided details of the
placement opportunities (e.g. location, compensation) which were known to the training
provider but not the trainees. We report on a randomised experiment that evaluates the
effect of these sessions on training completion and job placement.
A simple conceptual framework suggests that providing information about prospective jobs
can improve placement outcomes of vocational trainees in two ways. First, some trainees
may be over-optimistic about placement prospects, and participate in the training even
though their outside options are better than the placement jobs provided by the scheme,
while others maybe over-pessimistic, and drop out too early. Better information will lead
the over-optimistic trainees to leave the training and the over-pessimistic to stay. This
selection channel implies that the intervention would increase the probability of staying
in the job conditional on placement but have an ambiguous effect on training completion
and placement. Second, knowing about the details of the placement jobs may make it
easier for trainees to transition into employment. This job readiness channel implies that the
intervention increases the value of the job, decreases dropout, and increases placement.
1Official statistics from http://ddugky.gov.in/ accessed on 3 Sept 2020.
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We find that trainees in the treatment group were on average 18% more likely to stay in
the jobs in which they were placed but we do not find a significant effect on dropout
or placement. These findings tend to support the selection rather than the job-readiness
channel. A direct way to test for the mechanisms is to estimate the effect of information
on trainees’ expectations about the placement jobs. We leverage post-intervention data
on trainees expectations, and find some evidence that trainees in the treatment group are
on average less optimistic about their likelihood of taking-up and staying in placement
jobs. However, these results are not fully conclusive because the data were collected a few
months after the first information session, and we were unable to measure expectations for
trainees who had updated their expectations negatively and dropped out.
To provide more evidence on the mechanisms, we test for heterogeneous effects of our
treatment along three dimensions: gender, education, and caste. In terms of gender, we
find the treatment effects to be entirely concentrated on men, for whom the treatment
increased the probability of staying for at least five months in the placement job by as
much as 55%. In contrast, there was no effect on women, who in the control group were
much more likely to complete the training and take up placement jobs than men. This is
consistent with a selection channel, because women in this context have far fewer labour
market opportunities than men outside of the programme, so that mismatched expectations
are likely to be a bigger issue for men. Turning to heterogeneity by education levels, we
find the intervention to have opposite effects on less educated trainees relative to more
educated ones. For the less educated trainees, who in the absence of the intervention had
a higher dropout relative to more educated ones, the intervention reduced dropout by
35%. For more educated trainees, however, the treatment increased dropout by 50%. These
results are again in line with the selection channel, since more educated trainees have better
outside options, and are less likely to value the placement jobs than the others. Finally, we
do not find any significant effect of our treatment across different caste groups.
Our paper contributes to the relatively thin literature on the effectiveness of vocational
training programs in developing countries. The two review papers by Blattman and Ral-
ston (2017) and McKenzie (2017) suggest that vocational training often have limited effect
on employment outcomes, although experiments in Uganda by Alfonsi et al. (2020) and in
India by Maitra and Mani (2017) show that vocational training has large positive long-term
effects on employment and earnings. Other evidence from India suggests that vocational
training provided by Industrial Training Institutes is usually of poor quality (Gasskov et al.,
2003; Bertrand and Crepon, 2015). On the DDU-GKY programme itself, Chakravorty and
Bedi (2019) find that 2-6 months after training completion, the employment rates are not sig-
nificantly different between DDU-GKY participants and non-participants. Prillaman et al.
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(2017) also document low rates of employment among DDU-GKY trainees nine months
after training. Our contribution is to show that a simple information intervention can make
vocational training programmes more effective.
Our paper is one of few papers that evaluate information interventions in vocational train-
ing programs. Hicks et al. (2011) inform prospective vocational trainees about returns to
vocational training, with little effect on enrolment, apart from more females enrolling into
male-dominated courses. Jensen (2012) finds that providing information about new work
opportunities in call centres to female youth in India increases their demand for vocational
training and employment. In a very similar context to ours, Banerjee and Chiplunkar (2018)
study the mismatch between DDU-GKY preferences of the trainees and the jobs they are
placed in. They find that an intervention which informs placement officers about trainee
preferences improves the match between trainees and jobs, and that trainees who were
matched with their preferred job stay longer in that job. Our contribution is to show that
informing vocational trainees about placement opportunities can improve their placement
outcomes in another way: by inducing self-selection of trainees who are a better fit for the
available jobs.
We also contribute to the literature on barriers to youth employment in developing coun-
tries. The literature emphasises search costs (Franklin, 2018; Abebe et al., 2017b), skills
signalling (Abebe et al., 2018; Bassi and Nansamba, 2019; Orkin et al., 2020; Abel et al.,
2020; Groh et al., 2015), or the mismatch between employers’ and workers’ characteristics
(Abebe et al., 2017a). Our contribution is to show that providing more accurate information
about the characteristics of the jobs available to young workers may help them to success-
fully complete their training and transition to employment.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes our experimental design and data,
Section 3 provides a theoretical framework to interpret the effects of the intervention, Sec-
tion 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
2 The training programme and the experimental design
2.1 The vocational training programme
The DDU-GKY programme targets unemployed rural youth aged 15-35 years from poor
families with some secondary education (10th or 12th grade). There are quotas for fe-
male and low caste (Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes) trainees. The programme is
mainly residential, and provides a mix of classroom and on-the-job training. Training and
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placements are the responsibilities of private training providers. The study is located n the
states of Bihar and Jharkhand, two of the poorest states of India, where job opportunities
are scarce, so that most DDU-GKY placement jobs are located in other states.
2.2 Intervention
The sample includes 86 batches from training centres located in Bihar and Jharkhand. A
batch is a group of students who enrol, have classes, and graduate together. There were
2,488 trainees in total or an average of 30 trainees per batch. The randomisation was carried
out at the training batch level, stratified by state and trade, forming 13 randomisation
strata. 42 batches were treated (Online Appendix B). All sampled batches were residential
programs consisting of 107 days of classroom training on average (between 58 and 205
days) and 17 days of on-the-job-training (between 0 and 60 days).
The intervention was delivered in two classroom sessions (A and B):
• Session A took place in the first two weeks after batch start, before “batch freezing’,
the time after which no new trainees can be enrolled. Treatment batches were pro-
vided with a list of detailed characteristics of potentially available placement jobs. Each
list was specific to a training-centre and trade, and included: job title, company name,
location (city and state), and compensation package (net monthly wage and in-kind
benefits). Placement officers were available to answer questions.
• Session B took place approximately 10 days before the completion of the classroom
training. Trainees from the treatment batches were provided with a detailed list of
positions that were actually available to them, with job title, company name, location,
and compensation package. Trainees were warned about the need to prepare to take
up a for possible migration. Once again, placement officers were available to answer
questions.
2.3 Data
Our research is based on primary data collected from four rounds of surveys of trainees: the
baseline and the midline surveys were conducted face-to-face, and the two endline surveys
on the phone. Trainees who were not surveyed at baseline (either because they were absent
on the day of the baseline survey, or due to some other reason), were not surveyed in the
followup rounds.
4
• The baseline survey was administered from December 2018 to October 2019, to all
(2,488) participants present before batch freezing. We collected information on a wide
range of socioeconomic characteristics of the trainee and household, a range of psy-
chometric tests (GRIT, BIG 5, Attitude and self-esteem, life goals, risk preference),
expectations, preferences, opportunity cost, and programme awareness.
• The midline survey was conducted at the end of the classroom training but before
the trainees left for their placement jobs. This survey mainly captured the change in
expectations of the trainees. Interviews were carried out from March 2019 to January
2020 and covered 1,812 trainees who were present in the training centre on the day of
hte survey.
• The first endline survey was conducted approximately two months after the end of
the training, and the second endline five month after the end of the training. We
collected information on post-training outcomes focusing on training completion, job
placement, and job tenure. The first one one took place from May 2019 to April 2020
and cover 2,389 respondents. The second one from August 2019 to May 2020 and
covered 2,367 trainees.
Sample restrictions The Covid-19 pandemic and the lockdown that started on March 24
2020 caused severe disruption to the collection of our endline surveys. To accommodate the
disruption, we amended the original focus of the second-endline questionnaire regarding
respondents’ current status, to ask about status at the time of the 2020 Holi festival (which
started on March 9 2020) in order to better anchor the recollection of their activities. Online
Appendix Table C shows the number of individuals surveyed during the three sub-periods:
(i) pre-Holi (before March 9), (ii) between Holi and March 25 2020, and (iii) after March 25
2020. We restrict our analysis to the 2,163 individuals who had their first endline survey
before Holi.2
Attrition The attrition rate for each wave of the surveys, and the p-values associated
with the test of no difference across the treated and the control groups, are provided in
online Appendix Table D. Attrition is very low for the two endline surveys: 4% for the first
endline and 5% for the second endline. Attrition in the midline survey is higher (27%) as
the survey was only administered to trainees who were present at the time of the interview.
Importantly, attrition rates in all survey rounds are similar across the treatment and control
groups, including for the ‘restricted’ sample (Row 4 of Table D).
2We were not able to match 9 observations – see Row 1 Column 4 of online Appendix Table C.
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2.4 Summary statistics and balancing tests
The full set of variables and their definitions are provided in online Appendix Tables E1
and E2. Summary statistics of our baseline variables, and the results of the balance tests
for randomisation, are provided in online Appendix Table F. The average age in our sam-
ple is 20, and most trainees have some secondary education. There are more female than
male trainees, which is a remarkable achievement given the low labour force participation
of women in this context generally. In terms of caste, 15% of the trainees are Scheduled
Tribes, and 30% Scheduled Castes, which shows that DDU-GKY successfully targets dis-
advantaged youth.3 Another evidence of the pro-poor targeting of DDU-GKY is the very
high fraction (79%) of trainees from households below the poverty line. Median household
earnings are about 9,000 INR (122 USD) a month. Balancing tests suggest that there are no
issues with the randomisation (see Table F).
3 Model
We provide a simple theoretical framework to guide the interpretation of our results. It
illustrates two potential effects of information on employment and training outcomes: a




• At the time trainees enter the placement job, they compare their reservation utility
to the actual utility they derive from the job. R denotes the difference between the
reservation utility and the actual value of the job. If R > 0, youths leave the job. If
R < 0 they stay in the job.
• At the time trainees join the programme, they form an expectation about the utility
of the job they will be offered at the end of the training. Let V0 denote the difference
between the expected value of the job at the time of joining the programme and the
actual value of the job.
3The constitution of India classifies its citizens into four categories for affirmative action: Scheduled Castes
(SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) are various officially designated groups of historically disadvantaged people
in India. Other Backward Class (OBC) includes other groups/communities that are not SC or ST, and the rest
of the population is classified as general caste.
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• At the time trainees end the training and before they start in the job, they refine their
expectations. Let V1 denote the difference between the expected value of the job at
the time of completing the training and the actual value of the job.
• We assume that the learning process is such that V1 = lV0 + #, where # is a noise
parameter centred around zero that affects the value update during the training, and
l 2 [0, 1] is the learning parameter.
• Let lT denote the learning parameter for the treated group, and lC for the control
group. We assume lT  lC. The intervention gets expectations closer to the true
value of the job.
• Let Z is a binary treatment assignment indicator, which is randomised.
• Let D is a binary indicator for training completion and placement.
• Let S is a binary indicator for the individual staying in the DDU-GKY job for at least
5 months.
Timing:
• t=0: individual decides to go to the DDU-GKY centre iff V0 > R.
• t=1: individual decides to complete the training and take up the job (D = 1) iff
V1 > R.
• t=2: individual in placement job learns about its true value and decide to stay in the
job for at least five months (S = 1) iff R < 0.
3.2 Treatment effect on training completion and placement
Proposition 1. The treatment effect on training completion depends on youth expectations:
P(D = 1|Z = 1, V0 > 0)  P(D = 1|Z = 0, V0 > 0) < 0,
P(D = 1|Z = 1, V0 < 0)  P(D = 1|Z = 0, V0 < 0) > 0.
The information session brings trainees’ expectations closer to the true value of the job for
them. Hence the treatment discourages over-optimistic (V0 > 0) trainees, who become more
likely to drop out of the training and refuse placement, and encourages over-pessimistic
(V0 < 0) ones, who become more likely to complete training and accept placement. On-
line Appendix A Figure 1 provides an illustration of this proposition using a numerical
simulation.
7
3.3 Treatment effect on staying in job conditional on placement
Proposition 2. The treatment increases the probability to stay in job conditional on placement:
P(S = 1|Z = 1, V1 > R)  P(S = 1|Z = 0, V1 > R) > 0.
Trainees who are placed in the treatment group have more accurate expectations about the
placement job, and hence are more likely to stay in the job than in the control.
3.4 Treatment effect on being in the job five months after training
Proposition 3. The treatment has an ambiguous effect on the (unconditional) probability of being
in the job five months after training:
• For trainees for whom the job has a lower value than the outside option (R > 0), the treatment
does not affect the probability to be in the job, five months after training.
• For trainees for whom the job has a higher value than the outside option (R < 0) and who are
overoptimistic (V0 > 0), the treatment decreases the probability to be in the job five months
after training, by decreasing their probability to be placed.
• For trainees for whom the job has a higher value than the outside option (R < 0) and who are
over-pessimistic (V0 < 0), the treatment increases the probability to be in the job five months
after training by increasing their probability to be placed.
3.5 Extension with job readiness
By increasing awareness about the jobs early-on in the training, the intervention may help
trainees prepare themselves to the transition to employment. We model this as an increase
in the true value of the job by t, leaving the outside option unchanged.
Proposition 4. For all trainees, an increase in t will increase training completion, placement and
the probability of being in the job conditional on being placed.
3.6 Discussion
The model simplifies the decision-making process in two important ways. First, the number
of periods and hence the possibilities to drop out is kept to a minimum in the model. In
reality, trainees can drop out any time during training and employment spells (e.g., after
batch freezing but before midline, after placement but before training completion, after
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placement but before three months). We refrain from exploiting this variation for simplicity
and to preserve statistical power.
Second, in our framework, training completion and job placement are a single decision. In
practice the two steps are distinct, and the training may have a value for trainees indepen-
dently from placement. We choose not to explore this aspect for two reasons: (i) training
completion and placement are both posterior to the intervention; and (ii) since the infor-
mation provided by the intervention focused on placement jobs, it is unlikely to have major
effects on training decisions unrelated to placement.
4 Results
4.1 Empirical framework
We restrict our estimation sample to trainees present at baseline . A batch b is in treatment
group if Zb = 1, in the control group if Zb = 0. An individual i in batch b(i), assigned to
a randomisation stratum s(i), has a vector of baseline characteristics Xi (control variables).
Our main estimation model for outcome yi is:
yi = bZb(i) + Xi
0a + ds(i) + #i.
b is the intention-to-treat effect, the parameter of interest in our setting. We use post-
double-selection lasso as in Belloni et al. (2013) to select the control variables in Xi. We
cluster standard errors by batches, and compute q-value following the False Discovery
Rate method by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) to handle multiple hypothesis testing.
4.2 Main outcomes
Table 1 presents the results for our main outcomes in columns numbered [1]-[4]. We first
consider the probability that the trainee is in the DDU-GKY job five months after training
completion (column [1]). This is the unconditional probability based on the full sample:
the dependent variable takes the value of 0 for trainees who did not complete the training,
and those who completed the training but were not placed. In the control group, 33% of
all trainees who started the training are in a placement job. This probability is 4.6 per-
centage points (ppt) (14%) higher in the treatment group. However, this is not statistically
significant.
The probability of dropping out of the programme is 14% in the control group, and not
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significantly different in the treatment group (column [2]). The probability of being placed
among those who completed the training is 50% and is not different in the two groups (col-
umn [3]). Column [4] presents the treatment effect on the conditional probability of being
in the job for at least 5 months conditional on placement. This probability is estimated to
be 12 ppt higher in the treatment group compared to 62% in the control group, a 18% in-
crease. The effect is positive and significant at the 5% level, but is not robust to adjustments
to multiple hypothesis testing à la Benjamini and Hochberg (1995).
In summary, these results suggest that treatment increases the probability of staying in the
DDU-GKY job for at least 5 months by about 14-18%. We do not find significant effects on
either the probability of dropout or the probability of placement conditional on dropout.
Within the framework of our theoretical model, these findings are consistent with selection
effects cancelling out on average. For example, the increase in dropout among trainees who
are poor fits for the job and the decrease in dropout among trainees who are good fits for
the job, cancelling out. They could also be consistent with a positive job readiness effect to
the extent that it is not anticipated, e.g., if it has no positive effect on dropout or placement
but only materialises once the trainees are actually on the job.
Table 2 reports the results for the additional outcomes collected from the endline surveys:
trainees’ employment situation, their location, their life satisfaction, and whether they use
skills from training in their current employment if they were employed. We do not find any
evidence in support that the intervention increased formal employment among trainees:
although the estimated treatment effect is about 10% of the control mean, it is not significant
(p-value of 0.31). This suggests that some of the positive treatment effect on the probability
of being in the placement job after five months was compensated by trainees in the control
finding other paid employment. We do not find any significant effect on the other outcomes
– see Columns [2]-[4].
4.3 Heterogeneity
Tables 3 and 4 report results for the main outcomes by sub-samples defined by gender
(women vs. men), caste (Schedules Caste/Scheduled Tribe vs. General Caste), education
(below 12th grade vs. 12th grade and above), and expected salary in the placement job at
baseline (distinguished by whether the expected salary is above or below the median of
the realised placement salary).4 Caste and gender correspond to two socio-demographic
dimensions of focus for the DDU-GKY programme. Education and expectations corre-
spond to the two dimensions of heterogeneity in our conceptual framework: more educated
4The median calculated within strata (state⇥trade).
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trainees may be less likely to join the placement job as they have higher outside options
and trainees who expect the placement jobs to pay more than it actually does may be more
likely to be disappointed when they are placed.
We first consider the treatment effects for women and men separately – Table 3 Panel A.
In the absence of any intervention, compared to males, women are much more likely to be
placed in a DDU-GKY job (60% vs. 37%), and to be still working in that job five months after
completing their training (74% vs. 39%). This is probably due to the fact that DDU-GKY
offers work opportunities which are rare for rural women, whose labour force participation
is low (Chatterjee et al., 2015). There is also a clear differential effect of treatment by
gender: there is no significant effect of women, and the effects are concentrated among
men. The effects for men are significant at conventional significance levels and are very
large in economic terms: the intervention increases the probability of placement of men by
a third, from 36% to 47%, and their probability of retention by 46%, from 39% to 57%, i.e.
it closes the gender gap in placement and staying in job by half. A possible explanation is
that the mismatch between trainees’ expectations and the placement job is more an issue
for men, because they have a broader range of outside options than women.
We next explore heterogeneity in treatment effects along the caste dimension. On average,
trainees from disadvantaged background (SC/ST) are more likely to be placed (57% vs.
44%) and also to stay in the placement job (67% vs. 58%) after 5 months compared to
those from OBC/General castes (Table 3 Panel B). The estimated treatment effect is not
very strong in this dimension but tends to exacerbate the differences across castes: the
probability of staying in the placement job conditional on being placed increases by 15 ppt
for SC/ST trainees (p-value of 0.01), as compared to 6 ppt for higher-caste ones (p-value of
0.21), the p-value of the difference between the two effects is 0.21.
In Panel A of Table 4, we study treatment heterogeneity by trainee’s highest educational
attainment. This classification is based on whether the individual had completed 12th grade
or higher, or not. As expected, in the control, conditional on training completion, less
educated trainees were more likely to be placed and stay in the job than more educated
ones, which is consistent with the fact that the jobs available were only semi-skilled. At
the same time, however, less educated trainees drop out twice as often as more educated
ones (18% vs. 10%), which may be due to learning difficulties in the training programme.
Interestingly, the intervention reduces dropout for the less educated by 35%, and increases
dropout for the more educated trainees by 50%. The difference between the two effects
is highly significant (p-value 0.002). This suggests that better information improves the fit
between trainees and jobs. The intervention did not affect placement rates for any of the
11
two groups conditional on training completion, but did increase the probability to stay in a
DDU-GKY job for both groups, although the effect is stronger and significant only for the
less educated trainees.
Finally, Panel B of Table 4 considers heterogeneity in terms of expected placement salary
at baseline. Interestingly, a majority of trainees (1795 out of 2163) had expectations higher
than the median wage that was offered at the end of the training: only about a quarter (368
trainees) had over-pessimistic expectations, which is consistent with the idea that over-
pessimistic trainees are less likely to join the programme. As expected, over-pessimistic
trainees are also less likely to accept the job offer (36%) than over-optimistic trainees in
the control group. There is some evidence of a decrease in dropout and an increase in
placement for the trainees with low expectations, which goes in the expected direction.
However, given the small sample sizes, neither effect is significant.
4.4 Mechanisms
Following our theoretical framework, our intervention can affect the outcomes via two dis-
tinct channels: increasing job readiness and improving selection into remaining in training.
The selection channel comes from the fact that the intervention delivers information about
jobs. Better-informed trainees make more time-consistent decisions about completing the
training and accepting the placement job; those who get placed are a better fit for the jobs
available. The job readiness channel comes from the fact that the intervention prepares
trainees better for the transition to employment, so that they are more likely to stay in the
job once placed.
The heterogeneity results point to an increase in training dropout among trainees who are
more educated, and a decrease in dropout among trainees who are less educated, which is
more consistent with the selection mechanism. More educated trainees have better outside
options than the jobs offered to DDU-GKY trainees, and would be less likely to stay in the
DDU-GKY job anyway. We also observe a strong positive effect on the probability to stay in
the DDU-GKY job conditional on being placed without any effect on dropout or placement
on average. These effects can only be consistent with improved job readiness if trainees do
not realise or anticipate that the intervention made them more prepared for employment.
We can also explore the effect of the intervention on trainees’ expectations about their
labour market prospects, using information collected in the midline survey, which was
carried out before the end of the training and the second part of the intervention. An
important caveat is that 27% of trainees were absent at the time of the midline survey, in-
cluding those who dropped out of the training. This implies that the information collected
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in this survey is unlikely to capture the mechanisms highlighted in the model. In particu-
lar, if the intervention lowered expectations of over-optimistic trainees and induced them
to drop out or if it increased expectations of over-pessimistic trainees and made them stay,
average expectations in the sample of trainees still enrolled may not change.
With this caveat in mind, Table 5 presents the estimated treatment effects on the expecta-
tions of the trainees. In Panel A of Table 5 we do not find any significant effect on: (i) the
perceived probability of getting a job; (ii) the average wage they expected from this offer;
(iii) the range in which they expected this offer to be; (iv) the location of the job. For com-
pleteness, we report in Appendix Tables H1 and H2 results for the different dimensions of
heterogeneity (gender, caste, education and expectations at baseline) but do not find any
significant effect by subgroup or any differential effect. There is a positive effect on salary
expectations for trainees who are less educated, and those who are over-pessimistic at base-
line, and a negative effect on salary expectations for trainees who are more educated, and
who are over-optimistic at baseline, but none of these effects is significant. Panel B of Ta-
ble 5 presents some evidence that trainees in the treatment group revised downwards their
willingness to accept a job inside of their state of residence, from 86% to 83% (p-value 11%)
and the likelihood that they would stay 12 months outside of state from 86 to 82% (p-value
8%). While these effects are small and borderline significant, given the actual placement
rates which are much lower (50% conditional on training completion), they suggest that on
average trainees became more realistic about their placement outcomes.
An alternative explanation for our findings, which we do not include in our model, is that
the intervention affected the match between the preferences of trainees and the jobs of-
fered to them. For example, better awareness of the job opportunities at the end of the
training may lead trainees to express their preferences to placement officers, and choose
their preferred options. Banerjee and Chiplunkar (2018) show that providing information
to placement officers about trainees’ preferences leads to more durable matches. To inves-
tigate this possibility, we decompose the placement process into three steps: job offer, offer
acceptance, and job placement, and estimate the treatment effect on each of them using the
sample of trainees who completed the training. Appendix Table G1 presents the results.
There is no evidence that the treatment increases the likelihood of a job offer (Column [1]),
or the likelihood that the offer is accepted conditional on having been made (Column [2]).
In contrast, there is a positive but insignificant effect on the likelihood that trainees stay in
the job for two months (p-value 0.145). Conditional on staying for two months, they stay for
at least five months (p-value 0.033). These results confirm that the treatment improved the
fit between trainees and placement jobs by changing the pool of trainees, not by changing
the likelihood or the quality of the offers made to them.
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5 Conclusion
We conducted a randomised experiment to evaluate an intervention that provided detailed
information about placement jobs to trainees of the Indian vocational training programme
DDU-GKY. We find that better informed trainees were 18% more likely to stay in the jobs
they were placed in. The increase in the probability of staying in the placed job for at least 5
months seems to be driven by self-selection, i.e., better information about prospective jobs
led some trainees who had better outside options to drop out earlier and motivated those
for whom the job opportunities were more valuable to complete the training.
Our results suggests that providing detailed information about post-training job opportuni-
ties can help trainees form more accurate expectations, improve self-selection into training,
and improve placement outcomes. Given the low cost and the simplicity of the information
sessions, the intervention can easily be scaled up to help the programme meet its objectives.
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Table 1: Results: Main Outcomes
In Placement Training Job In Placement
Job after 5m Dropout Placement Job after 5m
(unconditional) (conditional) (conditional)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Treatment 0.046 0.000 0.001 0.115
(0.041) (0.021) (0.047) (0.053)
p-value 0.262 0.984 0.977 0.033
q-value (MHT) 0.525 0.985 0.985 0.131
Observations 2070 2089 1799 890
Control Mean 0.330 0.136 0.493 0.624
Sample All All Trained Placed
Notes: See Appendix Table E1 for variable definitions. The dependent variables are all binary
indicators taking the value of 1 as follows. Column [1]: The trainee was still in a DDU-GKY job
after five months (unconditional); Column [2]: The trainee dropped out of training; Column [3]: The
trainee was placed in DDU-GKY job conditional on training completion; Column [4]: The trainee
was still in a DDU-GKY job after five months conditional on training completion and placement.
All regressions control for baseline characteristics chosen by lasso selection (Belloni et al., 2013) as
well as strata fixed effects. Standard errors account for clustering at the batch level. The reported
p-value is for the test of no treatment effect and the q-value is the p-value of the same test accounting
for multiple hypothesis testing (MHT) following the False Discovery Rate method by Benjamini and
Hochberg (1995).
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Table 2: Results: Short-Term and Long-Term Outcomes
Formal Outside Use Skills Life
Job State from Training Satisfaction
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel A: Two Months after Training
Treatment -0.015 -0.019 -0.048 -3.937
(standard error) (0.044) (0.055) (0.066) (2.365)
p-value 0.734 0.727 0.469 0.100
q-value (MHT) 0.734 0.734 0.734 0.401
Observations 2089 2088 961 2089
Control Mean 0.461 0.431 0.804 73
Panel B: Five Months after Training
Treatment 0.035 0.021 -0.007 6.504
(standard error) (0.036) (0.041) (0.060) (4.020)
p-value 0.339 0.605 0.908 0.113
q-value (MHT) 0.679 0.808 0.909 0.452
Observations 2070 2070 864 1222
Control Mean 0.400 0.344 0.687 71
Notes: See Appendix Table E1 for variable definitions. The dependent variables [1], [2] and [3] are
binary indicators taking the value of 1, and [4] is a continuous variable ranging from 0% to 100%.
Column [1]: The trainee was in a formal wage employment; Column [2]: The trainee lived outside
their home state; Column [3]: The trainee used the skills learned in training in their current occupation;
Column [4]: Life satisfaction of the trainees. All regressions control for baseline characteristics chosen
by lasso selection (Belloni et al., 2013) as well as strata fixed effects. Standard errors account for
clustering at the batch level. The reported p-value is for the test of no treatment effect and the q-value
is the p-value of the same test accounting for multiple hypothesis testing (MHT) following the False
Discovery Rate method by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995).
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Table 3: Heterogeneity of treatment effects by gender and caste
In Placement Training Job In Placement
Job after 5m Dropout Placement Job after 5m
(unconditional) (conditional) (conditional)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel A: Gender
Treatment * Female 0.003 -0.013 -0.081 0.039
(0.053) (0.026) (0.066) (0.050)
Treatment * Male 0.105 -0.002 0.115 0.179
(0.057) (0.030) (0.066) (0.107)
p-value Treatment Female 0.956 0.619 0.221 0.446
p-value Treatment Male 0.054 0.664 0.220 0.042
p-value Difference 0.171 0.508 0.081 0.129
Observations 2070 2089 1799 890
Control Mean Female 0.460 0.116 0.602 0.744
Control Mean Male 0.185 0.158 0.365 0.390
Panel B: Caste
Treatment * Lower Caste 0.076 -0.017 -0.024 0.150
(0.063) (0.030) (0.056) (0.071)
Treatment * Higher Caste 0.038 -0.004 -0.016 0.060
(0.043) (0.030) (0.049) (0.067)
p-value Treatment Lower Caste 0.214 0.867 0.653 0.013
p-value Treatment Higher Caste 0.319 0.896 0.987 0.215
p-value Difference 0.525 0.833 0.591 0.211
Observations 2070 2089 1799 890
Control Mean Lower Caste 0.380 0.137 0.567 0.669
Control Mean Higher Caste 0.291 0.136 0.437 0.579
Notes: The dependent variables are all binary indicators taking the value of 1 as follows. Column [1]:
The trainee was in DDU-GKY job five months after the end of training; Column [2]: The trainee dropped
out of training; Column [3]: The trainee was placed in DDU-GKY job conditional on training completion;
Column [4]: The trainee was still in a DDU-GKY job after five months conditional on training completion
and placement. ”Lower Caste” is a dummy variable equal to one for Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled
Caste, ”Higher Caste” a dummy variable for Other Backward Class and General Castes. All regressions
control for baseline characteristics chosen by lasso selection (Belloni et al., 2013) as well as strata fixed
effects. Standard errors account for clustering at the batch level.
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Table 4: Heterogeneity of treatment effects by education and baseline expectations
In Placement Training Job In Placement
Job after 5m Dropout Placement Job after 5m
(unconditional) (conditional) (conditional)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel C: Education
Treatment * Less Educated 0.070 -0.058 -0.035 0.129
(0.052) (0.034) (0.050) (0.061)
Treatment * More Educated 0.048 0.050 -0.024 0.090
(0.043) (0.021) (0.050) (0.068)
p-value Treatment Less Educated 0.256 0.065 0.819 0.035
p-value Treatment More Educated 0.297 0.021 0.928 0.196
p-value Difference 0.724 0.002 0.747 0.590
Observations 2070 2089 1799 890
Control Mean Less Educated 0.379 0.183 0.573 0.664
Control Mean More Educated 0.293 0.101 0.437 0.587
Panel D: Salary Expectations
Treatment * Low Expectations 0.071 -0.043 0.016 0.197
(0.094) (0.033) (0.097) (0.167)
Treatment * High Expectations 0.051 0.002 -0.023 0.092
(0.042) (0.025) (0.044) (0.051)
p-value Treatment Low Expectations 0.452 0.207 0.842 0.242
p-value Treatment High Expectations 0.251 0.821 0.993 0.035
p-value Difference 0.792 0.215 0.834 0.557
Observations 2070 2089 1799 890
Control Mean Low Expectations 0.254 0.115 0.358 0.500
Control Mean High Expectations 0.344 0.140 0.519 0.641
Notes: The dependent variables are all binary indicators taking the value of 1 as follows. Column [1]: The
trainee was in DDU-GKY job five months after the end of training; Column [2]: The trainee dropped out of
training; Column [3]: The trainee was placed in DDU-GKY job conditional on training completion; Column [4]:
The trainee was still in a DDU-GKY job after five months conditional on training completion and placement.
”Less Educated” denotes trainees with less than 12th grade, ”More Educated” trainees with 12th grade and
above. ”Low Expectations” denotes trainees with baseline salary expectations below the median wage earned
by trainees of the same batch after placement. ”High Expectations” denotes trainees with expectations above
the median wage. All regressions control for baseline characteristics chosen by lasso selection (Belloni et al.,
2013) as well as strata fixed effects. Standard errors account for clustering at the batch level.
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Table 5: Results: Additional Outcomes
Treatment Standard p-value q-value Control
Error (MHT) Mean
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Panel A: Intermediary Outcomes
Likelihood of Job Offer 0.006 0.087 0.948 0.949 9.41
Average Salary -160.078 255.622 0.533 0.949 11334.025
Max - Min Salary -45.341 226.544 0.842 0.949 3693.044
Likelihood Job Offer Out of State -0.016 0.138 0.907 0.949 8.857
Panel B: Secondary Outcomes
Expected Earnings in 12 Months 293.758 485.074 0.547 0.703 14615.507
Preferred Earnings in 12 Months 824.164 565.874 0.150 0.394 18184.493
Likelihood Training Completion 0.049 0.036 0.175 0.394 9.800
Training Useful 0.006 0.079 0.943 0.971 9.452
Training Satisfaction 0.072 0.074 0.337 0.506 9.507
Likelihood Accept Job In State -0.310 (0.184) 0.096 0.394 8.548
Likelihood Stay 12 Months In State -0.346 (0.197) 0.083 0.394 8.501
Likelihood Accept Job Out of State -0.005 (0.147) 0.971 0.971 8.73
Likelihood Stay 12 Months Out of State -0.156 (0.157) 0.325 0.506 8.618
Notes: The dependent variables are captured at midline survey. See Appendix Table E1 for variable definitions.
Total number of observations used is 1613. Likelihood variables range from 0% to 100%. Panel A comprises of
Likelihood of getting a job at the end of the training; Expected average salary on the job offered at the end of the
training (in rupees); The difference between the maximum and the minimum expected salary on the job offered at
the end of the training (in rupees); Likelihood of getting a job outside of state at the end of the training. Panel B
shows the treatment effects on Expected earnings after 12 months; Desired earnings after 12 months; Likelihood
of completing the training; Degree to which the training is useful; Degree to which the trainees are satisfied with
the training; Likelihood of accepting a job in the state; Likelihood of staying 12 months in a job in the state after
accepting it; Likelihood of accepting a job outside the state; Likelihood of staying 12 months in a job outside the state
after accepting it. All regressions control for baseline characteristics chosen by lasso selection (Belloni et al., 2013) as
well as strata fixed effects. Standard errors account for clustering at the batch level. The reported p-value is for the
test of no treatment effect and the q-value is the p-value of the same test accounting for multiple hypothesis testing






We illustrate our theoretical predictions using a numerical simulation here. In Panel A, we
place individuals as a function of their V0 and R. Individuals who decide to enrol are all
those below the V0 = R line, for whom the expected value of the job is higher than their
outside option.
During the training, individuals receive information about the value of the job. The value
of V1 is shown on the x-axis of Panels B and C, while R remains unchanged on the y-axis.
Panel B shows the joint distribution of (V1, R) in the control group, for whom lC = .8. We
see that a few individuals are pushed out of the V1 > R part, and will choose to drop out.
For the treatment group, for whom lT = .2, the distribution of V1 is much more concen-
trated around the true value of the job (Panel C). Panel D highlights four types of candidates
by comparing the control and treatment distributions. The first group is composed of over-
optimistic trainees (square shape), for whom the treatment reduces V1, which increases
their dropout probability. The second group is composed of over-pessimistic trainees (tri-
angle shape), the treatment increase V1, bringing it closer to the truth, which increases their
training completion probability. The third group is composed of trainees who have low
value of the training and would drop-out with or without the intervention (cross shape).
The fourth group are trainees for whom the training is better than the outside option and
who would complete the training with or without the intervention (circle shape).
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Figure 1: Theoretical framework: numerical illustration
(a) Enrollment (b) Training completion (control group)
(c) Training completion (Treatment group) (d) Training completion (Treatment effect)
A.2 Proof of proposition 1
Given (D = 1) iff V1 > R
P(D = 1|Z = 1)  P(D = 1|Z = 0) =P(V1 > R|Z = 1)  P(V1 > R|Z = 0)
=P(lTV0 + # > R)  P(lCV0 + # > R)
Since lT < lC the sign of this expression depends on the sign of V0:
P(V1 > R|Z = 1, V0 > 0)  P(V1 > R|Z = 0, V0 > 0) < 0,
P(V1 > R|Z = 1, V0 < 0)  P(V1 > R|Z = 0, V0 < 0) > 0.
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A.3 Proof of proposition 2
P(S = 1|Z = 1, V1 > R)  P(S = 1|Z = 0, V1 > R)
= P(S = 1|lTV0 + # > R)  P(S = 1|lCV0 + # > R).
Since lT < lC, the expression is negative.
A.4 Proof of proposition 3
Proof: We first consider people with a negative value of being in the job (R > 0). For them,
the probability of staying in the job is equal to zero regardless of the treatment, so that the
impact of the treatment is mechanically zero:
P(S = 1|Z = 1, R > 0) = P(S = 1|Z = 0, R > 0) = 0
We next consider people with a positive value of being in the job (R < 0). They will be
placed if and only if they complete the training:
P(S = 1|Z = 1, R < 0)  P(S = 1|Z = 0, R < 0)
= P(D = 1|Z = 1, R < 0)  P(D = 1|Z = 0, R < 0)
= P(lTV0 + # > R|R < 0)  P(lCV0 + # > R|R < 0).
The sign of the above expression depends on the sign of V0:
• For trainees who are over-optimistic (V0 > 0) and have positive value of being in the
job (R < 0), the treatment effect on the probability of being in the job is negative:
P(lTV0 + # > R|V0 > 0, R < 0)  P(lCV0 + # > R|V0 > 0, R < 0) < 0.
• For trainees who are over-pessimistic (V0 < 0) and have a positive value of being in
the job (R < 0), the treatment effect on the probability of being in the job is positive:
P(lTV0 + # > R|V0 < 0, R < 0)  P(lCV0 + # > R|V0 < 0, R < 0) > 0.
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A.5 Proof of proposition 4
Treated trainees will choose to complete training and get placed iff lTV0 + t + # > R, while
the criterion remains lCV0 + # > R for trainees in the control group. Treated trainees who
get placed will choose to stay on the job iff R < t, while their control counterparts will stay
iff R < 0.
B Batches surveyed by sector
Table B: Number of batches surveyed by sector and state
Sector Control Treatment Total
BIHAR STATE
Apparel 3 3 6
Banking, Financial Services, and Insurance 3 3 6
Construction 7 7 14
Healthcare 1 1 2
IT 6 5 11
Logistics 1 1 2
Retail 4 4 8
Tourism-hospitality 3 2 5
TOTAL 28 26 54
JHARKHAND
Apparel 9 8 17
Automotive 1 1 2
Construction 4 5 9
Healthcare 1 1 2
Security 1 1 2
TOTAL 16 16 32
27
C Timing of the surveys
Table C: Endline completion dates and sample sizes
Second Endline
Time of survey Pre Holi Holi - 25 Mar Post 25 Mar Total
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Pre Holi 1092 187 893 2172
First Endline Holi - 25 Mar 0 0 62 62
Post 25 Mar 0 0 254 254
Total 1092 187 1209 2488
Note: This table shows the time periods for the first and second endlines. Column [1] presents the
survey periods, and Columns [2]-[5] present the numbers surveyed during the respective periods.
The start of the Holi festival was the 9th March, 2020.
D Attrition
Table D: Attrition Rates
Survey Control Treatment p-value
Timing Mean Effect
[1] [2] [3]
Attrition Midline 0.268 0.004 0.900
Attrition First Endline 0.041 -0.003 0.662
Attrition Second Endline 0.049 -0.001 0.886
COVID-related Sample Restriction 0.094 -0.010 0.777
Notes: Column [2] is obtained from the regression of attrition dummy on an intercept and the
treatment indicator, controlling for strata fixed effects. The p-values associated with the test of
no effect of treatment, are in Column [3]. The number of observations is 2,488.
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E Variable definition
Table E1: Outcome variables
Variable Name Variable Definition
Panel A: Main Outcomes
In placement job after 5 months (unconditional) In DDU-GKY job after 5 months of training completion
Training dropout The trainee dropped out of training during training tenure
Job placement (conditional) Placed in a DDU-GKY job conditional on training completion
In placement job after 5 months (conditional) Being in DDU-GKY job after 5 months of training com-
pletion conditional on placement
Panel B: Intermediary Outcomes
Likelihood job offer (0-10) Likelihood of getting a job offer after training
Average salary (Rs) Expected average salary on the job after training
Difference maximum - minimum salary (Rs) Difference of maximum and minimum expected
salaries in job after training
Likelihood job offer out of state (0-10) Likelihood of the job being outside the residence state
Panel C: Secondary Outcomes
Expected Earnings in 12 months Expected earnings after 12 months of training
Preferred Earnings in 12 months Preferred earnings after 12 months of training
Likelihood training completion (0-10) Likelihood of completing the training course
Training usefulness (0-10) Perception of training usefulness
Training satisfaction (0-10) Satisfaction with training
Likelihood accept job in state (0-10) Likelihood of accepting a job if the job is within the
residence state
Likelihood stay 12 months in state (0-10) Likelihood of staying in a job if the job is within the
residence state for 12 months
Likelihood accept job out of state (0-10) Likelihood of accepting a job if the job is outside of the
residence state
Likelihood stay 12 months out of state (0-10) Likelihood of staying in a job if the job is outside of the
residence state for 12 months
Panel D: Additional Outcomes
Formal job The trainee was in a wage/salaried job
Outside state The trainee lived outside the residence state
Use skills from training Used the skills learned in training in their current occupation;
Life satisfaction (0-10) Life satisfaction of the trainees
Notes: The likelihood variables are scored from 0% (least likley) to 100% (most likely).
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Table E2: Control variables
Variable Name Variable Definition
Panel A: Individual Characteristics
Female Trainee is female
Older (More than 20) Age of trainee more than 20 years
Married Trainee is married
Caste: ST Caste is Scheduled Tribe
Caste: OBC Caste is Other Backward Class
Caste: General Caste is General
Religion: Muslim Religion is Muslim
Religion: Christian Religion is Christian
Panel B: Education
Middle school (6-8 class) Educated till 6-8 class
Lower secondary (9-10 class) Educated till 9-10 class
Tertiary education (Graduate & above) Educated till graduation and above
Matriculation exam (Class X) Passed class 10th
Exam score more than 50% Matric exam score more than 50%
Higher secondary exam (Class XII) Passed class 12th
Exam score less than 50% 12th exam score less than 50%
Panel C: Skills
Big 5 Extraversion Test (1 to 5) Set of forty-four questions, scored between “strongly
disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5)
Big 5 Agreeableness Test (1 to 5)
Big 5 Conscientiousness Test (1 to 5)
Big 5 Neuroticism Test (1 to 5)
Big 5 Openness Test (1 to 5)
Grit Test (1 to 5) Set of seven questions, scored between “Very much
like me” (1) to “Not much like me at all” (5)
ASE Test (1 to 4) Set of ten questions, scored between “Strongly agree”
(1) to “Strongly Disagree” (4)
Life goal Test(1 to 4) Set of five questions, scored between “Very Important”
(1) to “Not at all important” (4)
Duration of baseline survey (above median) Duration of baseline survey more than median
Notes: These are based on information captured during the baseline survey.
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Table E2: Control variables (continued)
Variable Name Variable Definition
Panel D: Family Background
Household head relationship (mother) Head of household is mother
Household head relationship (others) Head of household is other than mother and father
Immediate difficulty to family immediate Difficulty to family if the trainee is in training centre during training
Future difficulty to family Difficulty to family if the trainee is in job outside the state for 12 months
Earning members (3 or more) Number of earning members in the household
Household earning (15000 or more) Household earning
Household earning (5000 or less )
Household earning (5001-9000 )
Agriculture land Household has agriculture land
BPL card Household is below poverty line
RSBY card Household covered under government health insurance scheme
MNREGA Any member of household worked in MNREGA in the past one year
SHG member Any member of household is a member of self-help group
Semi pucca house Type of house
Pucca house(IAY)
Pucca house(Non IAY)
Own house If the houshold own a house
Internet use If the trainee had used internet before joining training
Joint household Type of household
Household members (2 or less) Number of household members
Household members (6 or more)
Ever migrated out of state (self) Trainee migrated out of state in the last one year
Ever migrated out of state (relatives) Any household member migrated out of state in the last one year
Relatives migrated (one) Number of household members migrated out of state in the last one year
Relatives migrated (2 or more)
Note: Difficulty variables are expressed as a fraction between zero and one.
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Table E2: Control variables (end)
Variable Name Variable Definition
Panel E: Expectations
Previous earning Previous earning of trainee
Hypothetical earning (immediate) Hypothetical earning now, had he/she not participated in training
Hypothetical earning (in one year) Hypothetical earning one year from now, had he/she
not participated in training
Expected earning (in one year) Expected earning one year from now, after training completion
preferred earning (in one year) Preferred earning one year from now, after training completion
Expected minimum salary (immediate) Expected minimum salary in job after training
Expected maximum salary (immediate) Expected maximum salary in job after training
Expected average salary (immediate) Expected average salary in job after training
Training awareness Awareness of the training scheme
Training usefulness Perceived usefulness of the training programme
Training satisfaction Perceived satisfaction with the decision to participate
Likelihood of training completion Likelihood of completing the training programme
Likelihood of job offer Likelihood of getting a job offer after training completion
Likelihood of job offer outside state Likelihood that the job offer will be outside the residence state
Likelihood of accepting job inside state Likelihood of accepting a job if the job is in the residence state
Likelihood of retention in job inside state Likelihood of staying in this job for 12 months
Likelihood of accepting job outside state Likelihood of accepting a job if the job is outside the residence state
Likelihood of retention in job outside state Likelihood of staying in this job for 12 months
Note: The earning variables are dummy variables equal to one if the individual response is above the median in
the stratum (state⇥trade). The likelihood variables are expressed as a fraction between zero and one.
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F Summary statistics and balance test
Table F: Baseline summary statistics (averages) and balance tests - [Part 1 of 3]
Variable Control Treatment Diff p-value
Group Group [2]-[1]
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel A: Demographics and Caste
Female 0.564 0.585 0.021 0.758
Older (More than 20) 0.280 0.241 -0.039 0.131
Married 0.093 0.112 0.019 0.258
Caste:ST 0.153 0.146 -0.007 0.811
Caste:OBC 0.484 0.524 0.040 0.331
Caste:General 0.066 0.078 0.012 0.436
Religion:Muslim 0.059 0.054 -0.005 0.801
Religion:Christian 0.034 0.035 0.001 0.962
Panel B: Education
Middle school (6-8 class) 0.071 0.054 -0.017 0.142
Lower secondary (9-10 class) 0.362 0.364 0.002 0.950
Tertiary education (Graduate & above) 0.091 0.084 -0.007 0.670
Matriculation exam (Class X) 0.906 0.924 0.018 0.180
Exam score more than 50% 0.466 0.487 0.021 0.416
Higher secondary exam (Class XII) 0.553 0.565 0.012 0.756
Exam score less than 50% 0.228 0.216 -0.012 0.543
Panel C: Skills
Big 5 Extraversion Test (1 to 5) 3.294 3.289 -0.005 0.869
Big 5 Agreeableness Test (1 to 5) 3.747 3.775 0.028 0.338
Big 5 Conscientiousness Test (1 to 5) 3.815 3.916 0.101 0.009
Big 5 Neuroticism Test (1 to 5) 2.460 2.420 -0.040 0.333
Big 5 Openness Test (1 to 5) 3.904 4.007 0.103 0.030
Grit Test (1 to 5) 3.374 3.450 0.076 0.039
ASE Test (1 to 4) 2.104 2.084 -0.020 0.352
Life goal Test(1 to 4) 2.147 2.136 -0.011 0.588
Duration of baseline survey (above median) 0.501 0.541 0.040 0.362
Number of observations 1041 935
Notes: Variable definitions are provided in online Appendix Tables E1 and E2. Columns [1] and [2] report the
mean value in the control group and treatment group respectively. Treatment dummy coefficient estimates in the
regression of the variable, controlling for the strata fixed effects are in column [3]. All standard errors account
for clustering at the batch level. The p-value associated with the test of no treatment effect is in column [4]. Total
number of observations used is 1,976.
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Table F: Baseline summary statistics (averages) and balance test (cont’d) [Part 2 of 3]
Variable Control Treatment Diff p-value
Group Group [2]-[1]
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel D: Socioeconomic background
Household head relationship (mother) 0.077 0.084 0.007 0.560
Household head relationship (others) 0.084 0.124 0.040 0.009
Immediate difficulty to family 0.092 0.108 0.016 0.296
Future difficulty to family 0.138 0.150 0.012 0.543
Earning members (3 or more) 0.087 0.113 0.026 0.088
Household earning (15000 or more) 0.135 0.186 0.051 0.016
Household earning (5000 or less ) 0.314 0.245 -0.069 0.020
Household earning (5001-9000 ) 0.225 0.228 0.003 0.895
Agriculture land 0.603 0.667 0.064 0.050
BPL card 0.794 0.759 -0.035 0.188
RSBY card 0.371 0.345 -0.026 0.336
MNREGA 0.252 0.209 -0.043 0.062
SHG member 0.764 0.770 0.006 0.813
Semi pucca house 0.202 0.226 0.024 0.310
Pucca house(IAY) 0.099 0.076 -0.023 0.118
Pucca house(Non IAY) 0.191 0.220 0.029 0.272
Own house 0.995 0.994 -0.001 0.662
Internet use 0.478 0.488 0.010 0.793
Joint household 0.062 0.076 0.014 0.239
Household members (2 or less) 0.061 0.045 -0.016 0.117
Household members (6 or more) 0.384 0.379 -0.005 0.853
Ever migrated out of state (self) 0.121 0.121 0.000 0.986
Ever migrated out of state (relatives) 0.498 0.529 0.031 0.296
Relatives migrated (one) 0.364 0.357 -0.007 0.754
Relatives migrated (2 or more) 0.134 0.172 0.038 0.146
Number of observations 1,041 935
Notes: Difficulty variables are expressed as a fraction between zero and one. Also see notes provided with
the first part of this Table [Part 1 of 3].
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Table F: Baseline summary statistics (averages) and balance test (cont’d) [Part 3 of 3]
Variable Control Treatment Diff p-value
Group Group [2]-[1]
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel E: Expectations
Previous earning 0.099 0.105 0.006 0.712
Hypothetical earning (immediate) 0.113 0.144 0.031 0.148
Hypothetical earning (in one year) 0.184 0.203 0.019 0.557
Expected earning (in one year) 0.379 0.411 0.032 0.484
Preferred earning (in one year) 0.418 0.454 0.036 0.429
Training awareness 0.546 0.528 -0.018 0.369
Training usefulness 0.936 0.931 -0.005 0.510
Training satisfaction 0.947 0.947 0.000 0.934
Likelihood of training completion 0.952 0.944 -0.008 0.229
Likelihood of job offer 0.904 0.898 -0.006 0.523
Expected minimum salary (immediate) 0.372 0.406 0.034 0.546
Expected maximum salary (immediate) 0.384 0.422 0.038 0.444
Expected average salary (immediate) 0.449 0.487 0.038 0.473
Likelihood of job offer outside state 0.787 0.794 0.007 0.672
Likelihood of accepting job inside state 0.848 0.844 -0.004 0.758
Likelihood of retention in job inside state 0.838 0.832 -0.006 0.688
Likelihood of accepting job outside state 0.827 0.828 0.001 0.935
Likelihood of retention in job outside state 0.820 0.818 -0.002 0.884
Number of observations 1041 935
Notes: Earning variables are dummy variables equal to one if the survey response is above the median in the
stratum (state⇥trade). Likelihood variables are expressed as a fraction between zero and one. Also see notes
provided with the first part of this Table [Part 1 of 3].
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G Other outcomes
Table G1: Results: Job offer, acceptance, placement, and staying in job
Job Job Job In placement
Offer Acceptance Placement job after 5m
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Treatment -0.026 -0.033 0.067 0.116
(standard error) (0.046) (0.038) (0.046) (0.053)
p-value 0.576 0.390 0.145 0.033
q-value (MHT) 0.577 0.521 0.29 0.134
Observations 1688 1391 1091 883
Control Mean 0.833 0.795 0.790 0.623
Note: The dependent variables are all binary indicators taking the value of 1 as follows.
Column[1]: The trainee received job offer conditional on training completion; Column[2]:
The trainee accepted the job conditional on job offer being made; Column[3]: The trainee
was placed in a DDU-GKY job conditional on job acceptance; Column[4]: The trainee was
still in DDU-GKY job conditional on placement. All regressions control for baseline charac-
teristics chosen by lasso selection (Belloni et al., 2013) as well as strata fixed effects. Standard
errors account for clustering at the batch level. The reported p-value is for the test of no
treatment effect and the q-value is the p-value of the same test accounting for multiple
hypothesis testing (MHT) following the False Discovery Rate method by Benjamini and
Hochberg (1995).
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H Heterogenous effects of treatment
Table H1: Treatment effects on intermediary outcomes by gender and caste
Likelihood Average Max - Min Likelihood Job
Job Offer Salary Salary Offer Out of State
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel A: Gender
Treatment * Female 0.030 3.233 -194.060 -0.026
(0.128) (354.298) (318.412) (0.205)
Treatment * Male -0.048 -351.462 44.164 -0.064
(0.117) (324.245) (254.312) (0.183)
p-value Treatment Female 0.817 0.993 0.544 0.900
p-value Treatment Male 0.682 0.282 0.863 0.726
p-value Difference 0.653 0.450 0.559 0.884
Observations 1613 1613 1613 1613
Control Mean Female 9.334 10753.946 3857.620 8.791
Control Mean Male 9.503 12032.161 3494.975 8.937
Panel B: Caste
Treatment * Lower Caste -0.021 -153.442 139.856 -0.054
(0.124) (301.967) (332.991) (0.143)
Treatment * Higher Caste 0.024 -252.246 -279.364 -0.015
(0.104) (282.819) (225.103) (0.185)
p-value Treatment Lower Caste 0.869 0.613 0.676 0.708
p-value Treatment Higher Caste 0.821 0.375 0.219 0.936
p-value Difference 0.758 0.721 0.235 0.834
Observations 1613 1613 1613 1613
Control Mean Lower Caste 9.447 11297.943 3743.702 8.987
Control Mean Higher Caste 9.381 11362.787 3652.664 8.754
Notes: The dependent variables are captured at midline survey. See Appendix Table E1 for variable
definitions. Likelihood variables range from 0% to 100%. Column [1]: Likelihood of getting a job at the
end of the training; Column [2]: Expected average salary on the job offered at the end of the training
(in rupees); Column [3]: The difference between the maximum and the minimum expected salary on
the job offered at the end of the training (in rupees); Column [4]: Likelihood of getting a job outside of
state at the end of the training. ”Lower Caste” is a dummy variable equal to one for Scheduled Tribes
and Scheduled Caste, ”Higher Caste” a dummy variable for Other Backward Class and General Castes.
All regressions control for baseline characteristics chosen by lasso selection (Belloni et al., 2013) as well
as strata fixed effects. Standard errors account for clustering at the batch level.
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Table H2: Treatment effects on intermediary outcomes by education and baseline expecta-
tions
Likelihood Average Max - Min Likelihood Job
Job Offer Salary Salary Offer Out of State
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel A: Education
Treatment * Less Educated -0.047 118.836 46.561 -0.026
(0.117) (328.344) (324.621) (0.151)
Treatment * More Educated 0.049 -387.693 -91.802 -0.033
(0.105) (280.346) (218.080) (0.186)
p-value Treatment Less Educated 0.690 0.718 0.886 0.863
p-value Treatment More Educated 0.643 0.171 0.675 0.861
p-value Difference 0.484 0.121 0.635 0.974
Observations 1613 1613 1613 1613
Control Mean Less Educated 9.418 10890.164 3702.732 9.022
Control Mean More Educated 9.405 11651.937 3686.106 8.740
Panel B: Salary Expectations
Treatment * Low Expectations 0.030 49.327 -129.257 0.141
(0.112) (358.829) (370.468) (0.332)
Treatment * High Expectations -0.000 -185.937 -49.500 -0.046
(0.102) (281.993) (242.678) (0.142)
p-value Treatment Low Expectations 0.792 0.891 0.728 0.672
p-value Treatment High Expectations 0.997 0.512 0.839 0.748
p-value Difference 0.844 0.561 0.847 0.565
Observations 1613 1613 1613 1613
Control Mean Low Expectations 9.507 10699.247 3486.301 8.692
Control Mean High Expectations 9.391 11460.807 3734.337 8.891
Notes: The dependent variables are captured at midline survey. See Appendix Table E1 for variable defi-
nitions. Likelihood variables range from 0% to 100%. Column [1]: Likelihood of getting a job at the end of
the training; Column [2]: Expected average salary on the job offered at the end of the training (in rupees);
Column [3]: The difference between the maximum and the minimum expected salary on the job offered at
the end of the training (in rupees); Column [4]: Likelihood of getting a job outside of state at the end of the
training. ”Less Educated” denotes trainees with less than 12th grade, ”More Educated” trainees with 12th
grade and above. ”Low Expectations” denotes trainees with baseline salary expectations below the median
wage earned by trainees of the same batch after placement. ”High Expectations” denotes trainees with expec-
tations above the median wage. All regressions control for baseline characteristics chosen by lasso selection
(Belloni et al., 2013) as well as strata fixed effects. Standard errors account for clustering at the batch level.
38
